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Does Immigration Grease 
the Wheels of the Labor Market?
MOST STUDIES OF the economic impact of immigration are motivated by
the desire to understand how immigrants affect various dimensions of eco-
nomic status in the population of the host country. This motivation
explains the persistent interest in determining whether immigrants “take
jobs away” from native workers, as well as the attention paid to measur-
ing the fiscal impact that immigration inevitably has on host countries
that offer generous welfare beneﬁts.1
For the most part, the existing literature overlooks the factor that places
immigration issues and the study of labor mobility in general at the core of
modern labor economics. The analysis of labor flows, whether within or
across countries, is a central ingredient in any discussion of labor market
equilibrium. Presumably, workers respond to regional differences in eco-
nomic opportunities by voting with their feet, and these labor flows
improve labor market efﬁciency.
In this paper I emphasize this different perspective to analyzing the eco-
nomic impact of immigration: immigration as grease on the wheels of the
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ginal product of workers be equalized across labor markets, such as U.S.
metropolitan areas, states, or regions. Although workers in the United
States are quite mobile, particularly when compared with workers in other
countries, this mobility is insufficient to eliminate geographic wage dif-
ferentials quickly. The available evidence suggests that it takes around
thirty years for the equilibrating ﬂows to cut interstate income differentials
by half.2
I argue that immigration greases the wheels of the labor market by
injecting into the economy a group of persons who are very responsive to
regional differences in economic opportunities.3 My empirical analysis
uses data drawn from the 1950–90 U.S. censuses to analyze the link
between interstate wage differences for a particular skill group and the
geographic sorting of immigrant and native workers in the United States.
The evidence shows that interstate dispersion of economic opportunities
generates substantial behavioral differences in the location decisions of
immigrant and native workers. New immigrant arrivals are much more
likely to be clustered in those states that offer the highest wages for the
types of skills that they have to offer. In other words, new immigrants
make up a disproportionately large fraction of the “marginal” workers who
chase better economic opportunities and help equalize opportunities across
areas. The data also suggest that wage convergence across geographic
regions is faster during high-immigration periods. As a result, immigrant
ﬂows into the United States may play an important role in improving labor
market efﬁciency.
The paper presents a simple theoretical framework for calculating this
efficiency gain from immigration. Simulation of this model suggests that
the efficiency gain accruing to natives in the United States—between
$5 billion and $10 billion annually—is small relative to the overall econ-
omy, but not relative to earlier estimates of the gains from immigration
(which are typically below $10 billion). It seems, therefore, that the mea-
surable benefits from immigration are significantly magnified when esti-
mated in the context of an economy with regional differences in marginal
product, rather than in the context of a one-region aggregate labor market.
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2. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992); Blanchard and Katz (1992).
3. The analysis is similar in spirit to Card and Hyslop’s (1997) investigation of the
hypothesis that inflation greases the wheels of the labor market by making it easier for
employers to adjust real wages downward; see also Tobin (1972).
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The intuition underlying the hypothesis developed in this paper is easy
to explain.4 There exist sizable wage differences across regions or states
in the United States, even for workers with particular skills looking for
similar jobs.5 Persons born and living in the United States often find it
difficult (that is, expensive) to move from one state to another. Suppose
that migration costs are, for the most part, fixed costs, and that these are
relatively high. The existing wage differentials across states may then fail
to motivate large numbers of native workers to move, because the migra-
tion costs swamp the interstate differences in income opportunities. As a
result, native internal migration will not arbitrage interstate wage differ-
entials away.
In contrast, newly arrived immigrants in the United States are a self-
selected sample of persons who have chosen to bear the fixed cost of the
geographic move. Suppose that once this fixed cost is incurred, it costs
little more to choose one state as the destination over another. Income-
maximizing immigrants will obviously choose the destination that offers
the best income opportunities. Newly arrived immigrants will then tend
to live in the “right” states, in the sense that they are clustered in the states
that offer them the highest wages.
In short, the location decisions of immigrant workers should be much
more responsive to interstate wage differentials than those of natives. As
a result, immigrants may play a crucial—and neglected—role in a host
country’s labor market: they are “marginal” workers whose location deci-
sions arbitrage wage differences across regions. The immigrant population
may therefore play a disproportionate role in helping the national labor
market attain an efﬁcient allocation of resources.
The Location Decisions of Native Workers and Immigrants
This hypothesis can be formalized as follows. Consider initially the
interstate migration decision faced by workers born in the United States.
Let wjk be the wage paid in state j to a native worker with skills k (for
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5. Karoly and Klerman (1994) investigate the contribution of regional wage differen-
tials to overall trends in U.S. wage inequality.
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in state b. The sign of the index function determines the worker’s internal
migration decision:
(1) I = maxj {wjk} – wbk – C,
where C gives the migration costs. Although these include both variable
and fixed costs, I assume that they are mostly fixed. Perhaps the most
important fixed cost is the disutility suffered by the migrant who leaves
family and friends behind and begins life in a new and uncertain environ-
ment. The native worker migrates if I > 0.6
What does the index function in equation 1 imply about the equilibrium
sorting of native workers across states? Suppose that the fixed costs of
moving are very high, so that the wage gap between the current state of
residence and the state offering the highest wage cannot cover the migra-
tion costs. In this extreme case, the geographic distribution of native work-
ers is determined solely by the random allocation that occurs at birth and
has little to do with interstate differences in economic opportunities.
Because native workers do not respond to interstate wage differentials,
these differences will persist (in the absence of other equilibrating ﬂows).
Of course, native workers do in fact move from state to state. Some
natives will ﬁnd that the wage differential between the highest-paying state
and the current state of residence is sufﬁcient to cover the ﬁxed migration
costs. But many others will ﬁnd that these migration costs act as a wedge,
preventing them from taking full advantage of interstate differences in eco-
nomic opportunities. As a result, the native working population will not
be sorted efﬁciently, and many native workers end up living in states where
their marginal product is not maximized.
Capital flows across localities could help to equilibrate the national
economy. In the short run, however, moving physical capital—whether
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6. Equation 1 implicitly assumes that the national labor market is in disequilibrium, in
the sense that different regions offer different opportunities to the same worker. However,
regional wage differences may partly reflect compensating factors that penalize or reward
workers for various amenities or disamenities in the region where they live (Roback, 1982;
Topel, 1986). Even though a particular worker might face different wages in different labor
markets, that worker’s utility would then be constant across labor markets. The wage dif-
ferentials that determine the migration decision summarized by equation 1 are those that
persist after the analysis has controlled for regional differences in the value of amenities and
disamenities. 
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ment of capital stocks will depend largely on new investment, a process
that is gradual and can take many years. In what follows I simplify the
exposition by assuming that the capital stock is ﬁxed.
Immigrants are born in country 0 and are income maximizers. Their
index function is
(2) I = maxj {wjk} – w0k – C.
Since the wage differential between the United States and many other
countries far exceeds the differences that exist between regions in the
United States, it is likely that many residents of other countries will find
it optimal to move to the United States.7 More important, the self-selected
sample of foreign-born workers observed in survey data collected in the
United States is composed of persons for whom the index I defined in
equation 2 is positive. Suppose then that a particular immigrant worker
chooses to live in state  . For immigrants in the United States, this resi-
dential choice must satisfy the condition
(3) w k = maxj {wjk}.
Put differently, immigrants in the United States will reside in the state
that pays the highest wage for the skills they possess. Note that the condi-
tion in equation 3 holds regardless of the level of fixed costs, the magni-
tude of interstate dispersion in wages, or the size of the wage differential
between the United States and the source country. Relatively high fixed
costs (or a relatively high wage in the source country) simply imply that
there will be fewer immigrants. But the sample of foreign-born workers
who choose to move will still end up in the right state.
This hypothesis has a number of interesting implications. First, because
many native workers are “stuck” in the state where they were born, and
immigrant workers are clustered in the states that offer the best economic
opportunities, immigrants and natives will be observed living in different
states. Moreover, different types of immigrants—depending on their
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7. Of course, the provisions of immigration policy allow the United States to pick and
choose among the many persons who demand entry. But these policy restrictions are bind-
ing only on the subsample of foreign-born persons who ﬁnd it optimal to move to the United
States in the ﬁrst place.
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immigrant workers to a particular regional labor market should exhibit
greater sensitivity to interstate wage differentials than the labor supply of
natives.
Second, the group of immigrants whose location decisions are most
responsive to regional differences in economic opportunities should be the
sample of newly arrived immigrants. Over time, economic opportunities
will probably change differently in different states, and the sample of new
immigrants will become like the sample of natives in one very specific
way: they all get trapped in the state where they reside. As a result, earlier
immigrant waves should be found living in different states than the newest
immigrants.
Third, the insight that the location decisions of a particular group of
workers—recent movers—are most sensitive to interstate wage differences
is not specific to immigrants. It applies to any group of movers, whether
foreign-born or native-born. As a result, the location decisions of the self-
selected sample of native workers who have chosen to move across states
should also be quite sensitive to interstate wage differentials.
Finally, the clustering effect implicit in equation 3 has important impli-
cations for studies of labor market equilibrium and for estimates of the
beneﬁts from immigration. Native migration ﬂows, perhaps because of rela-
tively high ﬁxed migration costs, cannot fully arbitrage away the regional
wage differences. The immigrant ﬂow, in contrast, is self-targeted to those
regions of the country where their productivity is highest. As I will show
shortly, this clustering effect greases the wheels of the labor market, by
speeding up the process of wage convergence, and improves economic
efﬁciency. It is important to emphasize that these gains from immigration
differ conceptually from the productivity gains typically stressed in the lit-
erature.8The productivity gains arise because immigrants and natives com-
plement each other in the production process, and estimates of these gains
explicitly assume that the national labor market is in a “single-wage”
equilibrium.
Obviously, these strong theoretical implications follow from a frame-
work that uses very restrictive assumptions. In particular, I ignore the
many factors other than wage differentials that determine the location
74 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
8. Borjas (1995) and Johnson (1998) provide extended discussions of the economic
beneﬁts from immigration in a one-sector framework.
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decisions of both immigrants and natives. For example, the resurgence of
immigrant flows into the United States since 1965 has led to the creation
of large ethnic enclaves in many American cities, but in the context of
this model it is unclear that these ethnic enclaves arise exogenously. For
instance, the first immigrant arriving in the United States from country n
may have chosen to live in region j because that region maximized his or
her income opportunities.9 If most workers in a particular national origin
group have roughly similar skills, it would not be too surprising if most
new immigrants from that source country also settle in region j. But the
ethnic networks that link immigrants in the United States with their source
countries also help transmit valuable information about income opportu-
nities to potential migrants. These information flows reduce the costs of
migration to specific regions for particular ethnic groups and could lead
to a different geographic sorting than that predicted by the income maxi-
mization model with fixed migration costs. Any empirical analysis of the
magnetic effects generated by interstate differences in labor market oppor-
tunities, therefore, must incorporate relevant information about these eth-
nic networks.
Welfare Implications
Why does the greater sensitivity of immigrants than natives to regional
wage differentials generate economic gains? How large are those gains?
And do they accrue to immigrants or to the native population?
Before addressing these questions, it is instructive to review how the
beneﬁts from immigration arise in the traditional, one-sector model. Sup-
pose the production technology in the host country can be described by a
linear homogeneous aggregate production function with two inputs, capi-
tal and labor (L), the price of the output being the numéraire. Suppose
further that all workers, whether native or foreign-born, are perfect sub-
stitutes in production. Finally, assume that natives own the entire capital
stock in the host country and that the supply of all factors of production
is perfectly inelastic.
In a competitive equilibrium, the price of each factor equals its marginal
product. Figure 1 illustrates the initial preimmigration equilibrium, with N
9. Suro (1998) describes how the migration of a single person from the Guatemalan
region of Totonicapan to Houston developed into a flow over the subsequent years, with
many of the workers in this immigrant ﬂow ending up in related jobs.
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fixed, the area under the curve representing the marginal product of labor
(fL) gives the economy’s total output. National income, all of it accruing to
natives, is then given by the trapezoid ABN0.
The entry of M immigrants shifts the supply curve to S and lowers the
market wage to w . The area in the trapezoid ACL0 now gives national
income. Part of the increase in national income is distributed directly to
immigrants (who get w M in labor earnings). The area in the triangle BCD
is the increase in national income that accrues to natives, or the “immi-
gration surplus.” Note that the immigration surplus arises because natives
own all of the capital, and the additional labor raises the return to this ﬁxed
capital stock. The immigration surplus, as a fraction of GDP, is10
(4) surplus = 
1⁄2 sδm2,
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10. Borjas (1995, p. 7).
Figure 1. Immigration Surplus in a Single-Region Economy with Homogeneous
Labor and Fixed Capital
Source: Author’s model as described in the text.
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factor price elasticity (or –d ln w/d ln L), and m is the fraction of the work
force that is foreign-born. To illustrate, suppose that labor’s share of
income is 0.7, that the factor price elasticity is 0.3 (so that a 10 percent
increase in labor supply lowers wages by 3 percent), and that immigrants
make up 10 percent of the work force (as in the United States today).
Equation 4 then implies that the immigration surplus is on the order of
0.1 percent of GDP, or roughly $10 billion annually.
Now consider the nature of the gains from immigration in a multi-
region economy where there are wage differences across regions in the
initial equilibrium.11 Suppose the United States has two regions and that
the same linear marginal product schedule, fL, gives the labor demand
curve in each. The total (and fixed) number of natives in the economy is
N, with a fraction λ of the natives living in region 1. For concreteness,
assume that λ < 0.5. Further suppose that labor is supplied inelastically in
each region, with supply curves S1 and S2, respectively. As before, natives
own the entire capital stock, which is fixed within each region. Figure 2
illustrates the initial equilibrium. The supply imbalance between the two
regions implies that w1, the wage in region 1, exceeds w2, the wage in
region 2. 
Since capital is fixed in each region, one can write the quadratic pro-
duction function in region j (j = 1, 2) as
where Lj gives the number of workers in region j, and β > 0. This quadratic
production function generates the linear marginal product curves in fig-
ure 2. The initial wage of workers in region 1 equals w1 = α−2βλN, and
the wage in region 2 is w2 = α – 2β(1 – λ)N. These wages are assumed to
be positive over the relevant range of employment. I assume initially that
natives are immobile, so that the regional wage differential is not arbi-
traged away by internal migration.
Suppose the United States decides to admit M immigrants. It is useful
to write M in terms of the number and geographic distribution of natives in
the labor markets. In particular, the difference in the number of natives
() – , 5
2 QLL jj j =α β
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11. I am grateful to Robert Topel for raising a number of questions that helped to clar-
ify some of the conceptual issues that arise in this type of framework.
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grants can then be written as
(6) M = k(1 – 2λ) N.
The parameter k = 1 when the number of immigrants exactly equals the
supply imbalance between the two regions. If all of these immigrants
were to enter region 1 (as income-maximizing behavior on the part of
immigrants would imply), immigration would completely equalize wages
between the two regions. In terms of figure 2, this case of “complete
immigration” would shift the supply curve in region 1 to S
–
1, and the sin-
gle wage in the national economy would be w2. For simplicity, I will
assume that 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 throughout the analysis.
Let θ be the fraction of immigrants who choose to live in region 1. The
total number of workers in each region can then be written as
(7) L1 = λN + kθ(1 – 2λ)N
(8) L2 = (1 – λ)N + k(1 – θ)(1 – 2λ)N,
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Figure 2. Total Gain from Complete Immigration in a Two-Region Economya
Source: Author’s model as described in text.
a. Assumes homogeneous labor and fixed capital. Under complete immigration, exactly enough immigrants enter region 1 to
equalize wages between the two regions.
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given by
(9) Q = α[N + k(1 – 2λ)N] – β[λN + kθ(1 – 2λ)N]2
– β[(1 – λ)N + k(1 – θ)(1 – 2λ)N]2.
The parameter θ equals 1 when the geographic sorting of immigrants in
the United States is the sorting that maximizes immigrant income. Not sur-
prisingly, this type of immigrant behavior also maximizes GDP for the
entire U.S. population (which now includes both natives and immigrants).
Put differently, Q is maximized at θ = 1 for a given volume of immigration.
Figure 2 illustrates the nature of this result for the special case where k =1 .
The increase in GDP to the entire country if all immigrants were to migrate
to region 1 equals the area under the demand curve between points B and
C. In contrast, the increase in GDP if all immigrants were to migrate to
region 2 equals only the area under the demand curve between the points
B  and C . Comparing these two polar cases makes it clear that the net
increase in GDP attributable to optimizing behavior on the part of immi-
grants is given by the shaded triangle BCE.
In an important sense, this result summarizes the economic content of
the statement that immigration greases the wheels of the labor market:
income-maximizing behavior leads to a more efficient allocation of
resources and maximizes GDP per capita in the host country. This type of
immigrant behavior speeds up the process of adjustment to long-run equi-
librium, and the larger national output may impart beneﬁts to some sectors
of the economy. In the absence of any redistribution mechanism, how-
ever, it turns out that the immigrants get to keep much of the increase in
GDP that can be attributed to their locating in the high-wage region. As a
result, it is important to examine to what extent natives benefit from the
fact that income-maximizing immigrants cluster in high-wage regions
and thereby improve market efficiency. Consider again the case where
natives are immobile. The income accruing to natives is then given by
(10) QN = Q – w1M1 – w2M2.
The maximization of equation 10 with respect to θ indicates that the rela-
tion between QN and θ is U-shaped. In fact, the value of QN is the same at
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natives is minimized when θ = 0.5, regardless of the value of k. Put dif-
ferently, natives gain the most when immigrants cluster in one region,
regardless of where they cluster, and natives gain the least when immi-
grants allocate themselves randomly across regions. 
Figure 2 also illustrates the intuition behind this result for the special
case where k = 1. Suppose that all immigrants cluster in the high-wage
region (θ = 1). The net gain to natives is then given by the triangle BCD. In
contrast, suppose that all of the immigrants end up in the low-wage region
(θ = 0). The net gain to natives then equals the triangle B C D , which is
obviously equal in area to triangle BCD. The assumption of identical and
linear demand curves in the two regions effectively builds in the result that
the net gain to natives is the same whenever there is complete clustering,
regardless of where immigrants cluster.12
This conclusion also depends crucially on the assumption that the
native work force is immobile. It is easy to show that natives beneﬁt more
when immigrants cluster in high-wage regions as long as natives can move
across regions and it is costly to make that internal move. After all, the
initial regional wage gap would have eventually motivated some native
workers to move across regions. The clustering of income-maximizing
immigrants in the high-wage region reduces the number of natives who
need to engage in internal migration and hence reduces the migration costs
that natives have to incur.
To illustrate this point in a simple framework, suppose that immigrants
enter the country first, and that natives then base their internal migration
decisions on the postimmigration regional wage gap. Suppose further that,
although costly, the internal migration of natives is instantaneous and com-
plete, in the sense that all natives who need to move to equalize wages
across regions do so immediately. The number of natives who need to
move across regions is then given by
Deﬁne the “net” income accruing to natives as
()
– ( – )[ ( – )]
. 11
2
12 1 12
2
21 R
LL k N
==
+ λθ
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12. Note that this “neutrality” result hinges crucially on the assumed linearity of the
labor demand curves. With constant-elasticity demand curves (as implied by a Cobb-
Douglas production function), the convexity of the demand curve would imply that the gains
accruing to natives are larger when θ = 1 than when θ = 0.
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where w = w1 = w2, and C(R) gives the migration costs associated with R
native workers moving across regions, with C (R) > 0. Because natives
“fill in” to arbitrage the regional wage gap regardless of where immigrants
choose to cluster, it should be evident that the quantity Q – wM1 – wM2 in
equation 12 is independent of θ. In the end, half of the labor force end up
in region 1 and half in region 2, and wages are equalized. The relation-
ship between QN and θ, therefore, depends entirely on how the geographic
sorting of immigrants affects migration costs. Inspection of equations 11
and 12 shows that the larger the fraction of immigrants who cluster in the
high-wage region (that is, the greater is θ), the fewer natives need to move
across regions, the lower is the level of migration costs, and the larger is
the net income that accrues to the native population.13
In fact, the increase in migration costs that natives must incur if immi-
grants are to cluster in the low-wage region can be substantial and may
well swamp any benefits resulting from the clustering effect. Let R0 be
the number of natives who would have to move to equate wages if all
immigrants clustered in the low-wage region (θ = 0), and let R1 be the
number of natives who would have to move if all immigrants clustered in
the high-wage region (θ = 1). Equation 11 then implies that
The implications of equation 13 are easily grasped with a numerical exam-
ple. Suppose k = 0.5, so that half as many immigrants enter the country as
complete immigration would require. The ratio in equation 13 then
equals 3. In other words, native migration is three times as large when
immigrants cluster in the low-wage region as when they cluster in the
high-wage region. The additional migration costs, therefore, could easily
outweigh the beneﬁts that immigrants impart to natives when they cluster
in the low-wage region.14
()
–
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+
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13. This discussion implicitly assumes that expenditure on migration vanishes from the
economy rather than being transferred to other persons. This is likely to be the case if the
main component of migration costs is the disutility associated with leaving a familiar envi-
ronment and starting over again in a different and unfamiliar area.
14. A numerical example also helps to illustrate this point. Suppose there are 100 mil-
lion native workers in the economy and that immigration increases the supply of workers
by 10 percent, so that there are 10 million immigrants. Suppose further that λ = 0.4 and
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region is optimal in two different ways: it increases total national income,
and it maximizes the income that accrues to natives net of migration costs.
By moving the economy from an initial equilibrium with a regional wage
gap to a new equilibrium with either a single national wage (in the case
of complete immigration) or a smaller regional wage gap, immigrants gen-
erate two distinct types of benefits for natives.15 First, they raise national
income through the traditional immigration surplus: because the capital
stock is ﬁxed, immigrants increase the proﬁts of native capitalists by more
than they lower the earnings of native workers. Second, they help narrow
the gap between marginal products in the two regions, maximize the
increase in GDP that accrues to natives, and reduce the volume of migra-
tion costs that natives would have had to incur. It is this second type of gain
that results from the fact that immigration greases the wheels of the labor
market.
In a multiregion framework and for a given volume of immigration, it
seems sensible to define the gains that accrue to natives from the geo-
graphic sorting of immigrants in another way. How much do natives ben-
efit from the income-maximizing behavior of immigrants relative to how
much they would have benefited if the immigrants had chosen locations
in some other way? Obviously, this operational definition of the gain is
inherently ambiguous, because one must ﬁrst deﬁne the nonoptimal behav-
ior that might determine the geographic distribution of immigrants.
Throughout the analysis, I define the baseline as the income that would
have accrued to natives if immigrants had simply replicated the geographic
sorting of the native population. In other words, suppose that a fraction λ
of the immigrants choose to live in region 1. The gain that accrues to
natives is then given by
() – . 14 1 ∆ NN N QQ = = = θ θλ
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k = 0.5. In this example, 5 million natives would have to move to equalize wages when
immigrants cluster in the high-wage region, and 15 million would have to move when
immigrants cluster in the low-wage region. Even if the annualized migration cost were as
low as $1,000, the additional migration cost incurred by natives because of the “inefficient”
immigrant clustering would be $10 billion, easily swamping most available estimates of the
gains from immigration. 
15. This analysis is closely related to the study of the benefits from trade when there is
an intersectoral difference in marginal products; see Hagen (1958) and Magee (1972, 1973).
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bile native population gains as immigrants cluster rather than replicate
the regional distribution of the native population. In the simple frame-
work presented in this section, the beneﬁts that arise from immigrant clus-
tering are the same regardless of whether immigrants cluster in the
high-wage or the low-wage region.16 However, the fact that natives even-
tually move in response to interregional wage differences—together with
the fact that these moves are costly—implies that ∆N captures an additional
benefit: the reduced costs of internal migration. In the remainder of the
paper I will refer to the sum of the two types of benefits captured by the
variable ∆N as the efficiency gain from immigration. The efficiency gain
thus measures how much natives gain from a fixed volume of immigra-
tion simply because immigrants choose to settle in high-wage regions.
It is worth stressing that the choice of a baseline in equation 14 plays a
crucial role in any calculation of the efficiency gain. The arbitrary nature
of this choice, however, does not alter an important implication of the
analysis: without any intervention on the part of the native population,
immigration by income-maximizing persons not only maximizes national
income but also maximizes the efficiency gain, the additional net income
that accrues to the native population. 
Figure 3 illustrates the nature of the efficiency gain defined in equa-
tion 14. For simplicity, I show the labor market conditions in region 1 only,
and I ignore the savings in migration costs. Initially, the labor market is
in equilibrium with wages w1 and w2. As drawn, λ = 0.25, so that one-
quarter of the natives live in region 1 and the rest in region 2 (with supply
curves S1 and S2, respectively). Suppose there is complete immigration and
that all immigrants locate in the high-wage region (k = 1 and θ = 1). The
economy is now in a single-wage equilibrium, and natives gain by the
size of the triangle formed by the union of areas a, b, and c.
Suppose instead that immigrants did not behave optimally in making
their location decisions, and suppose further that θ = 0.25, so that immi-
grants replicate the geographic sorting of the native population. This sort-
ing of immigrants shifts the supply curve in region 1 to S1  . The immigrants
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16. The notion of an equilibrium where immigrants are clustered in the low-wage area
is not as far-fetched as it sounds. During the late 1980s, for example, Sweden routinely
placed refugees in regions outside Stockholm, which are coincidentally the country’s low-
wage regions. See Åslund, Edin, and Fredriksson (2000).
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for natives, whereas those who locate in the low-wage region generate a
gain of area b for natives. It is evident that the optimal sorting increases
native income over that with the nonoptimal sorting by the rectangular area
c. This rectangle is the gain accruing to natives, for a given volume of
immigration, over and above that from a sorting that simply replicates the
geographic sorting of the native population.17
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17. Although the discussion has focused on determining how the gains from improved
efﬁciency are distributed between immigrants and natives, there are equally interesting dis-
tributional consequences within the native population. As with the immigration surplus in
the one-sector model, the gains from immigration defined in equation 14—abstracting
from the savings in migration costs—accrue to native capitalists. In contrast, the gains attrib-
utable to the savings in migration costs accrue to native workers.
Figure 3. Gains Accruing to Natives under Optimal and Nonoptimal Sortinga
Source: Author’s model as described in text.
a. Assumes complete migration and an immobile native work force.
Wage
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extensive use of the assumption that the two regions of the economy have
the same labor demand curve. The theoretical implications are less
straightforward when the two regions have different demand curves, as
could result from underlying differences in the (ﬁxed) endowment of phys-
ical capital. It is still the case, of course, that total GDP increases most
when immigrants cluster in the high-wage region. Abstracting from the
savings in migration costs, however, natives now have the most to gain
when immigrants cluster in the region with the more inelastic demand
curve.18 After all, for a fixed number of immigrants, the size of the trian-
gle that accrues to natives is larger when the demand curve is steeper. The
region with the more inelastic demand is not necessarily the region with
higher wages. However, it should be clear that the bunching of immigrants
in the “wrong” region—from the perspective of total economic effi-
ciency—would lead, in the long run, to more native migration and increase
migration costs for the native population. It might also greatly reduce any
gains arising from immigrants pursuing a location strategy that does not
maximize their income.
Finally, the one-period framework summarized in this section shows
that the interaction among immigrants clustering in high-wage regions, the
regional wage structure, and native internal migration can increase the
income accruing to the native population. A more complete description of
this interaction requires embedding the income-maximizing behavior of
immigrants in a multiperiod model of native internal migration, one that
allows for natives to adjust slowly to the presence of regional wage dif-
ferences. This dynamic model is presented below and used to provide a
back-of-the-envelope calculation of the efﬁciency gain.
Data
I examine the link between interstate wage differentials and the location
decisions of immigrants and natives using data from the 1960–90 Public
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18. This extension of the model raises a number of very interesting and policy-relevant
questions. For example, an inelastic labor demand curve in a particular region may reﬂect
a relatively low volume of physical capital in that region. Immigration policy could then be
used to build up the capital stock in the low-capital region by granting entry to persons
willing to invest in those regions (and, perhaps not coincidentally, also increase the short-run
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 85Use Microdata Samples of the decennial census. The sample extracts used
in the analysis include all civilian workers aged eighteen to ﬁfty-nine who
do not live in group quarters. The immigrant extracts form a 5 percent
random sample of the population in 1980 and 1990, and a 1 percent ran-
dom sample in 1960 and 1970. The native extracts form a 1 percent
random sample in all years. I define a worker to be an immigrant if he or
she was born abroad and is either a noncitizen or a naturalized citizen; all
other persons are classiﬁed as natives.
I begin the empirical analysis by constructing a log wage index to mea-
sure the relative wage of a skill group in a particular state at a particular
time. Five skill groups are defined in terms of educational attainment:
less than nine years of schooling, nine to eleven years of schooling, twelve
years of schooling (high school graduates), thirteen to fifteen years of
schooling, and at least sixteen years of schooling (college graduates).19
The wage index is calculated as follows. Let wijk(t) be the wage of worker
i, residing in state j, belonging to skill group k, in census year t. I then used
the sample of native workers to estimate the following regression model
separately in each census for the years 1960, 1970, and 1980:20
(15) ln wijk(t) = Xijk(t) β(t) + vjk(t) + uijk(t),
where Xijk(t) gives a vector of socioeconomic characteristics indicating the
worker’s sex and age (defined as a vector of dummy variables indicating
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gains that accrue to the native population). This argument can be used to justify the employ-
ment creation program in current U.S. immigration policy, where visas are “sold” at lower
prices to those persons willing to invest in regions that have relatively poor economic
prospects.
19. I also conducted the analysis with the skill groups defined in terms of occupation.
The results were qualitatively similar to those reported. 
20. Ideally, one would want to use the sample of immigrant workers to predict the wage
that a foreign-born worker could expect to earn in each of the states. Because immigrants are
highly clustered in a very small number of states, however, there are many empty (j, k) cells,
preventing the calculation of a complete series of the log wage index. Moreover, Jaeger’s
(1996) analysis of the 1980 and 1990 censuses indicates that changes in relative supplies
of immigrants and natives within a sex-education group have little effect on the wage gap
between immigrants and natives for that group. This evidence suggests that immigrants
and natives may be nearly perfect substitutes in production within broad education cate-
gories, further justifying the use of the log wage index estimated in the native population
to approximate the regional wage dispersion faced by potential migrants. The regression
for the 1960 census has 434,195 observations, that for the 1970 census has 567,620, and that
for the 1980 census has 860,365.
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four, thirty-five to forty-four, forty-five to fifty-four, or fifty-five to sixty-
four); vjk(t) gives a vector of ﬁxed effects for state-education groups (j, k)
at time t; and uijk(t) is the error term, assumed uncorrelated with all the
independent variables in the model. The dependent variable and all the
variables in vector X are normalized to have a mean of zero in each census.
The log wage index vjk(t) can then be interpreted as the (adjusted) wage
differential, in percent, between the wage in state-education group (j, k)
and the mean wage in the United States at time t. Note that the log wage
index does not adjust for cost-of-living differences across states. The
empirical analysis reported below will control for these differences by
including a vector of state ﬁxed effects in second-stage regression models. 
Figure 4 illustrates the interstate variation in the log wage index revealed
by the 1960 and 1980 census data for selected education groups. Not sur-
prisingly, there is a great deal of dispersion in adjusted wages across states, so
that different states offer different opportunities to similarly skilled workers.21
Consider, for instance, the wage opportunities available to a college gradu-
ate in 1980. If he or she chose to live in Wyoming, the state at the 20th per-
centile (so that ten states offered lower wages), the log wage index took on a
value of 0.18. If that college graduate chose instead to live in Nevada, the
state at the 80th percentile, the log wage index took on a value of 0.35. In
other words, interstate wage differentials are sizable even when we ignore the
ten states at each end of the wage distribution.
Although high-wage states tend to offer high wages to all workers
regardless of educational attainment, this correlation is far from perfect. In
1980 the correlation between the log wage index of workers with less
than nine years of schooling and that of college graduates was only 0.72.22
To illustrate how the same state may offer relatively different opportunities
to different types of workers, consider the log wage indices for New York
and California. Both are high-wage states, but New York’s wage advantage
is particularly pronounced for highly educated workers. In 1980 sixteen
states paid higher wages than New York to workers with less than nine
years of schooling, but only ﬁve states paid higher wages to college grad-
uates. In contrast, California’s wage offer to workers with less than nine
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21. Topel (1986).
22. The remaining correlations between college graduates and other workers are as fol-
lows: 0.73 for workers with nine to eleven years of schooling, 0.82 for workers with twelve
years, and 0.90 for workers with thirteen to ﬁfteen years.
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Figure 4. Interstate Dispersion in Adjusted Wages, by Educational Attainment, 1960
and 1980a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data for persons aged eighteen to ﬁfty-nine from the 1960 and 1980 Public Use Micro-
data Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. Measured by the log wage index, which is the sex- and age-adjusted differential between the log wage of workers in a partic-
ular state-education group and the mean log wage in the United States. It is calculated from a log wage function estimated separately
for each census year.
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to college graduates was only the ninth highest. 
Finally, ﬁgure 4 shows that the relative wages that states offer to work-
ers with particular skills change over time. The correlations between the
1960 and the 1980 log wage indices range from 0.75 to 0.92, depending on
the education group. As a result, workers in a given education group might
wish to live in different states at different times. For instance, Washing-
ton, D.C., offered the eighth-highest wage to college graduates in 1960. By
1980, however, the District’s offer to college graduates had risen to
become the third highest in the nation. 
There are, therefore, substantial wage differences across states for partic-
ular skill groups. This paper argues that immigrants should be particularly
responsive to these differences. This hypothesis, however, would seem to
contradict a well-known stylized fact: immigrants have clustered and con-
tinue to cluster in a relatively few states. In 1990, 74 percent of newly arrived
immigrants (those who had been in the country for less than ﬁve years) lived
in one of the six main immigrant-receiving states: in descending order these
are California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois. In contrast,
only 36 percent of natives lived in those states.
Although this clustering might raise serious doubts about the validity of
my argument, it is simply not true that all immigrants cluster in the same
states. It turns out that different types of immigrants tend to live in differ-
ent states, and that the nature of the clustering has changed over time.
Table 1 describes the geographic distribution of newly arrived immigrants.
In 1990 half of all new immigrants with less than nine years of schooling
lived in California, compared with only a quarter of those with a college
education. In contrast, 9.2 percent of immigrants with less than nine years
of schooling, and 14.9 percent of immigrants who were college gradu-
ates, lived in New York. Overall, the data reveal that although fewer than
20 percent of immigrants who were high school dropouts lived outside
the six main immigrant-receiving states, almost 40 percent of immigrants
with a college degree did so.
Moreover, the differences in the geographic sorting of immigrants can-
not be fully accounted for by the job structures offered by the various
states. As the bottom panel of table 1 shows, the ratio of the percentage of
immigrants with less than nine years of schooling who live in California
to the percentage of similarly skilled natives who live there rose from
4.1 percent to 9.4 percent between 1970 and 1990. In contrast, the same
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In sum, the stylized fact that most immigrants move to the same states
misses an important part of the story: there is a great deal of dispersion
in the residential choices made by different types of immigrants.
The theory advanced by this paper suggests that the relative supplies
of immigrants and natives to various states will depend on interstate wage
differentials. As noted above, I calculated the log wage indices in census
year t (where t = 1960, 1970, 1980). I now calculate the measures of rela-
tive supplies by analyzing the location decisions of immigrants who
arrived soon after the year in which the log wage index is calculated. Let
Mjk(t*) be the number of immigrants who arrived “soon after” time t,
reside in state j, and belong to skill group k, and let Mk(t*) be the total
number of new immigrants who belong to that skill group. The group of
newly arrived immigrants is composed of persons who entered the United
States in the ﬁve-year period after the log wage index is measured, so that
t* = t + 5. The variables Njk(t*) and Nk(t*) give the corresponding numbers
of native workers in the state-education groups at that particular time. I
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Table 1. Newly Arrived Immigrant Population in the Six Largest Immigrant-
Receiving States, by Educational Attainment, 1970 and 1990
Less than Nine to Thirteen to At least
nine years eleven years Twelve years ﬁfteen years sixteen years
State 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990
Percent of new immigrantsa
California 22.0 50.1 22.3 41.9 21.4 32.7 25.7 33.2 17.8 26.5
New York 23.4 9.2 24.6 14.8 24.4 18.6 19.8 14.1 19.1 14.9
Florida 9.1 5.6 6.7 8.1 6.7 8.1 5.8 7.8 3.2 5.0
Texas 5.2 10.1 2.6 7.2 3.2 5.1 2.6 5.4 3.9 5.2
New Jersey 8.9 2.9 7.3 4.1 6.8 5.8 3.7 4.7 4.7 6.3
Illinois 7.0 4.4 5.3 3.9 5.6 5.0 6.3 4.3 7.7 4.7
Percent of new immigrants relative to percent of natives (ratio)
California 4.1 9.4 2.7 4.9 2.2 4.4 1.7 2.6 1.5 2.2
New York 3.3 1.7 2.8 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.8
Florida 2.9 1.3 2.1 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.1 1.2
Texas 0.8 1.2 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.8
New Jersey 2.9 1.3 2.1 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.6
Illinois 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1970 and 1990 Public Use
Microdata Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. New immigrants have been in the United States less than ﬁve years.
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 90then deﬁne the index of relative supply for the state-education group (j, k)
at time t* as23
The variable Zjk(t*) measures the relative supply of newly arrived immi-
grants in education group k to state j. The denominator effectively
“deﬂates” the supply of immigrant workers in a particular skill group to a
particular state by the relative importance of that state in the employment
of similarly skilled native workers. The relative supply index equals 1
when immigrant and native workers belonging to the same education
group have the same geographic distribution. The index would be greater
than 1 if immigrants in education group k were overrepresented in state j. 
I estimated the index of relative supply for each state-education group
using the 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses. Each census provides informa-
tion on the person’s state of residence ﬁve years before the census. To min-
imize the amount of time that elapses between the measurement of the
log wage index (time t) and the observation of a state of residence for a
worker (time t*), I used the mid-decade measure of location to calculate
the relative supply indices. In other words, the 1960 log wage index (cal-
culated from the 1960 census) will be related to the 1965 relative supply
measure (calculated from the 1970 census), and similarly for the 1970s
and the 1980s.
The cross-sectional relationship between the log wage index and the
index of relative supply is summarized in table 2. For each of the five
education groups, the table differentiates between the states paying the
highest and those paying the lowest wages. The highest-paying states for
an education group are those where the log wage index for that group
ranks in the top ﬁve, and the lowest-paying states are those where the log
wage index ranks in the bottom ﬁve. For each set of states I then calculated
the average index of relative supply. Table 2 strongly suggests a behavioral
clustering effect for new immigrants, at least in the cross section. Consider,
for example, the geographic distribution of workers who are high school
() ( * )
(* )/ (* )
(* )/ (* )
. 16 Zt
Mt Mt
Nt Nt
jk
jk k
jk k
=
George J. Borjas 91
23. The supplies of immigrants and natives are calculated using the sample of all persons
who are not living in group quarters and who are eighteen to fifty-nine years old at the
middle of the decade.
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high school graduates is 2.4. In contrast, new immigrants are relatively
absent from the ﬁve states that offer the lowest wages for high school grad-
uates: the relative supply index in the “worst” states is 0.14. Generally,
new immigrants tend to be overrepresented in the states that offer the high-
est wages, and underrepresented in the states that offer the lowest wages.24
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24. I also calculated the statistics reported in table 2 using alternative breakdowns of
the “best” and “worst” states, such as the ten (rather than ﬁve) states offering the highest and
the ten offering the lowest wages. The qualitative conclusions were very similar.
Table 2. Relative Labor Supply of New Immigrants in High- and Low-Wage States,
by Educational Attainmenta
Relative supply indexb
New immigrants  New immigrants relative 
relative to natives to earlier immigrants
Census year and Five highest- Five lowest- Five highest- Five lowest-
educational attainment wage states wage states wage states wage states
1960
Less than nine years 2.681 0.017 1.237 0.333
Nine to eleven years 1.937 0.262 1.095 2.258
Twelve years 1.688 0.368 1.045 1.792
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years 1.480 0.397 1.046 1.306
At least sixteen years 1.238 0.289 0.890 0.956
1970
Less than nine years 1.250 0.022 0.770 0.328
Nine to eleven years 1.003 0.065 0.739 0.307
Twelve years 1.029 0.207 0.737 0.670
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years 0.921 0.264 0.790 0.958
At least sixteen years 1.083 0.384 0.885 1.214
1980
Less than nine years 4.964 0.045 1.210 0.691
Nine to eleven years 2.709 0.082 1.196 0.513
Twelve years 2.360 0.143 1.217 0.523
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years 1.880 0.192 1.134 0.721
At least sixteen years 1.920 0.312 1.143 0.850
Source: Author’s calculations based on data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1960–90 Public Use Microdata
Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. High- and low-wage states are those with high and low values, respectively, of a log wage index calculated for the indi-
cated census year and skill group. The index measures the sex- and age-adjusted differential between the log wage of workers in
the indicated education group in a given state and the mean log wage in the United States. Relative supply indexes are calculated
from pooled data for the ﬁve highest-wage and the ﬁve lowest-wage states. New immigrants are those entering the United States
within ﬁve years after the log wage index is measured; earlier immigrants have been in the country for at least ﬁve years.
b. Calculated as newly arrived immigrants from a particular state-education group as a percentage of all newly arrived immi-
grants in that education group, divided by the same ratio for natives (or earlier immigrants).
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high-wage states not only relative to natives, but also relative to immi-
grants who arrived in earlier waves. To show this, the last two columns of
the table use a slightly different definition of the relative supply index.
Let Ejk(t*) be the number of immigrants in earlier waves who reside in
state j and belong to skill group k at time t*, and let Ek(t*) be the total num-
ber of these earlier immigrants belonging to that skill group. The earlier
immigrants have been in the United States for at least five years before
the measurement of the log wage index.25 One can then deﬁne an alterna-
tive relative supply index:
Equation 17 provides a simple way of netting out the impact of ethnic
networks on residential choice. Suppose that these networks lower the
costs of migrating to the areas where the ethnic enclaves are located by
transmitting information about economic opportunities in those areas and
by providing a welcoming environment (in terms of language and cul-
ture) to new immigrants. If these networks are very effective and new
immigrants simply move to the areas where their compatriots already
reside, the new immigrants should be living in exactly the same places as
the older immigrants. In contrast, if new immigrants are more responsive
to the changing economic environment, they will be overrepresented rela-
tive to the older immigrants in those states that offer the highest wages
for their particular skills.
The calculations reported in table 2 suggest that the two cohorts of
immigrants locate themselves in somewhat different states, with the new
immigrants tending to be overrepresented in those states that offer the
best economic opportunities for their skills (this was particularly true in
1980).26 Consider, for example, workers who have between nine and
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25. For example, the group of earlier immigrants defined in the 1970 census would
include immigrants who arrived in the United States before 1955 (since the relevant log
wage index is measured as of 1960).
26. Note, however, that there is little evidence that the new immigrants in the 1960s (that
is, the 1960–64 arrivals) cluster in very different places than the earlier immigrants (the
pre-1955 arrivals). All of these immigrants, however, arrived before the resurgence of immi-
gration to the United States, and a relatively large fraction were refugees. It is unclear that
income maximization plays an important role in determining where these types of immi-
grants settle when they ﬁrst enter the country.
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equation 17 was 1.2 in the ﬁve states offering the highest wages, but only
0.5 in the ﬁve states offering the lowest.
The descriptive analysis in this section thus ﬁnds sizable interstate wage
differentials among workers who have similar skills and a tendency for dif-
ferent types of immigrants to live in different states. Most important, the
interstate wage differentials seem to be correlated with the residential
choices made by new immigrants—relative to the choices made by natives
and by earlier immigrant waves.
Empirical Results
Admittedly, this cross-sectional correlation between regional wage dif-
ferentials and the subsequent location decisions of new immigrants could
be spurious, because immigrants, for reasons unrelated to economic
opportunities, may simply be moving to those states (such as California
and New York) that happen to pay high wages. It turns out, however, that
the relative supply of immigrants to a particular state varies over time in
response to relative wage changes in that state. Consider the following
ﬁrst-difference regression model:
where ηj is a state fixed effect, γk is an education fixed effect, and ϕt is 
a period fixed effect. The unit of observation in this regression is a state-
education group during a particular decade. (For example, it may be the
change in the relative supply index observed for high school graduates
between the early 1960s and the early 1970s, or that for college graduates
between the early 1970s and the early 1980s.) The data are pooled across
the two decades, so that the regression has 510 observations (two periods
× five education groups × fifty-one states, the fifty-first being the District
of Columbia).
To illustrate the nature of the regression in equation 18, consider the
observation that measures the change in the relative supply of new immi-
grants between the 1970s and the 1980s. The variable Zjk(t1
*) gives the rel-
ative supply index (as of 1985) for the new immigrants with skills k who
arrived between 1980 and 1984, whereas vjk(t1) gives the log wage index as
() ( ) – () [ () – () ] ,
** 18 10 1 0 Zt Zt vt vt jk jk jk jk j k t =+ + + + θη γ ϕ ε
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*) gives the relative supply index (as
of 1975) for the new immigrants with skills k who arrived between 1970
and 1974, whereas vjk(t0) gives the log wage index as of 1970. The parame-
ter θ then estimates the sensitivity of the relative supply index to the wage
changes that occurred within a particular state-education group over the
decade.27
Basic Regressions
Table 3 reports estimates of θ from alternative specifications of the
model in equation 18. Each coefﬁcient in the table comes from a different
speciﬁcation. All regressions are weighted by (n0
–1 + n1
–1)–1 , where nt gives
the number of observations in the state-education group (j, k) at time t.
The coefficients reported in the first row of table 3 are from regres-
sions that do not include the state and education fixed effects in equa-
tion 18; those in the second row are estimated from models that do. The
state fixed effects play a particularly important role because they control
for state-specific changes in the cost of living over the decade (as well as
for any other state-specific factors that might change the relative supply
of immigrants).28 The regression results are not affected qualitatively by
the inclusion of the state and education ﬁxed effects. Therefore I will limit
the discussion to the results obtained from the more general (and pre-
ferred) speciﬁcation.
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27. The generic first-difference regression model in equation 18 can also be estimated
in terms of a level specification. With the data pooled over all three decades, the following
regression model can be estimated:
Zjk(t) = θ vjk(t) + (ηj ×ϕ t) + (γk ×ϕ t) + (γk ×η j) + εjk(t),
where (ηj ×ϕ t) represents a vector of ﬁxed effects that fully interact the cell’s state of res-
idence and the period fixed effect; (γk ×ϕ t) gives a vector of fixed effects interacting the
cell’s education and the period fixed effect; and (γk ×η j) gives a vector of fixed effects inter-
acting the cell’s education and the state of residence. If the level regression is weighted by
the sample size of the (j, k) cell, the numerical value of the coefﬁcient θ is the same in this
level speciﬁcation as in equation 18.
28. To see how the state ﬁxed effects in a ﬁrst-difference regression control for differences
in the cost of living, consider a generic regression model ∆yj = a + b ∆ log (wj/pj) + e, where
∆ log wj is the change in the logarithm of the wage in state j over some time period, and
∆ log pj is the change in the logarithm of the price index. Note that this regression is equiva-
lent to ∆yj = a + b ∆ ln wj – b ∆ ln pj + e. This regression can be estimated either by includ-
ing a measure of the cost-of-living index (which is not available before the 1970s) or, more
generally, by including a vector of state ﬁxed effects. 
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each state, the total number of immigrants—regardless of the year of migra-
tion—with the number of natives. In the second data column the index com-
pares the number of earlier immigrants with that of natives, and in the third
data column the index compares the number of new immigrants with that of
natives (the relative supply index deﬁned in equation 16). The last column
uses the relative supply index defined in equation 17, which contrasts the
residential locations of new immigrants and earlier immigrants, bypassing the
location choices made by native workers altogether.
The positive regression coefficient reported in the first cell of each of
the first two rows indicates that the relative supply of immigrants in a
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Table 3. Estimating the Sensitivity of Relative Labor Supply of Immigrants to
Interstate Wage Differencesa
Estimated coefﬁcient on log wage index
New 
Earlier New immigrants
Fixed Immigrants immigrants immigrants relative to
Sample and effects in relative to relative to relative to earlier
speciﬁcation model?b natives natives natives immigrants
1960–80 No 0.580 –0.245 1.150 1.149
(0.295) (0.277) (0.355) (0.360)
1960–80 Yes 0.643 –0.560 1.754 2.145
(0.253) (0.250) (0.373) (0.438)
1960–70 Yes –0.525 –0.551 0.258 1.554
(0.585) (0.496) (0.936) (1.092)
1970–80 Yes –0.476 –0.613 0.507 3.019
(0.831) (0.886) (0.556) (0.751)
1960–80, Yes 0.817 –0.409 1.993 3.557
men only (0.307) (0.305) (0.438) (0.971)
1960–80, Yes 0.499 –0.674 1.526 1.830
women only (0.219) (0.230) (0.360) (0.495)
1960–80, IVc Yes –2.752 0.327 2.254 44.356
(6.588) (5.521) (7.936) (44.479)
Source: Author’s calculations using data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1950–90 Public Use Microdata
Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. The dependent variable for each specification is the change in the relative supply index over a given period. The indepen-
dent variable is the change in the log wage index. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The multiple-decade speciﬁcations
pool the data for 1960–70 and 1970–80 and have 510 observations (five education groups in fifty-one states over two periods).
These regressions include a dummy variable for the decade from which the observation was drawn. Regressions estimated for
single decades have 255 observations. All regressions are weighted by (n0
–1 + n1
–1)
–1, where nt gives the number of observations
for the state-education group in year t.
b. Speciﬁcations with ﬁxed effects include vectors indicating the state of residence and educational attainment.
c. Instrumental variables regression using as an instrument the previous decade’s wage growth in that state-education group.
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skill group was also rising. The sensitivity of immigrant supply to inter-
state wage differentials, however, differs across immigrant groups. In par-
ticular, the location choices of earlier immigrants relative to those of
natives are not positively related to within-state changes in the log wage
index. In contrast, new immigrants are very responsive to wage changes.
To get a sense of how responsive they are, it is useful to convert the coef-
ficient θ into a relative supply elasticity, d ln Z/d ln v. Abstracting from
scale effects, this elasticity gives the percentage change in the relative
number of immigrants who choose to reside in a particular state for a given
percentage change in the wage. This elasticity is given by the ratio θ/Z.
The mean value of the relative supply index for new immigrants (in the
1980s) is 1.4. The estimated supply elasticity for new immigrants relative
to natives is then 1.3 (1.754 ÷ 1.4).
The regression results reported in the ﬁrst three data columns of table 3
ignore the possibility that nonwage factors, such as the pull of ethnic
enclaves on potential migrants, may partly determine the residential
choices of immigrants relative to those of natives. As I argued earlier, one
can partly net out the impact of ethnic enclaves by comparing the resi-
dential locations of new immigrants with those of earlier immigrants. The
last column of the table reports the regression coefﬁcients from the model
that uses this alternative index of relative supply.
The evidence indicates that the location decisions of new immigrants
exhibit greater sensitivity to interstate wage differentials than do those of
earlier immigrants. The relative supply elasticity is also 1.3.29The analysis
thus suggests that, even when one controls for idiosyncratic factors that
help determine the location decisions of immigrants in the United States,
it is still the case that the supply of new immigrants to particular labor mar-
kets is very responsive to the regional wage structure.
In their studies of the impact of immigration on native wages, Borjas,
Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz, as well as Robert Schoeni, report
that the sign of the geographic correlation between past immigration and cur-
rent wages seems to depend on the period under analysis.30 In some decades
the correlation between wage growth in a particular labor market and immi-
gration into that labor market is positive, whereas in other decades it is neg-
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29. The mean of the relative supply index for new immigrants relative to earlier immi-
grants is 0.9.
30. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997); Schoeni (1997).
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ing the excess sensitivity hypothesis holds up in different periods. The third
and fourth rows of table 3 reestimate the regressions using the 1960–70 and
the 1970–80 periods, respectively. The excess sensitivity hypothesis is
roughly consistent with the evidence in each of the decades under analysis,
although the results are stronger for the 1970–80 period.
The ﬁfth and sixth rows of table 3 replicate the (pooled) analysis in the
samples of men and women, respectively. The relative supply elasticities
tend to be more positive for men than for women.31 The weaker supply
elasticity found among women is consistent with the hypothesis that the
location decision of female immigrants is strongly influenced by family
considerations. For instance, the sample of female immigrants may contain
many tied movers and tied “stayers,” contaminating the correlation
between a worker’s wage and the migration decision.32 The sample of
female immigrants likely contains many women whose location decisions
are tied to those of their foreign-born husbands, or who are tied stayers
because they are married to native men and hence face relatively high ﬁxed
costs of moving across states.
Finally, there may be some contemporaneous correlation between wage
growth in a particular state-education group in any given decade and the
residual ε in equation 18.33 One common solution to this problem is to
use as an instrument for the decade’s wage change the wage change expe-
rienced by the same state-education group in the previous decade. This
procedure requires estimating the log wage index in the 1950 census, to
get the change in the log wage index for each group during 1950–60. I
reestimated the regression model in equation 14 on data from the 1950
census, using the same sample restrictions and variable deﬁnitions as in the
analysis of the subsequent censuses.34
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31. The mean of the relative supply index for new male immigrants relative to male
natives is 1.5, so that the relative supply elasticity in the male sample is 1.3. The mean of the
relative supply index for new female immigrants relative to female natives is 1.4, and the rel-
ative supply elasticity in the female sample is 1.1.
32. Mincer (1978).
33. One possible source of endogeneity bias could be reverse causation between the
relative supply index and the log wage index. For example, the sample of earlier immigrants
(who arrived at least five years before the observation of the log wage index) could have
themselves affected the wage in the local labor market.
34. The empirical analysis uses the “sample line” observations from the 1950 Public Use
Microdata Sample, since these are the only observations that contain information on edu-
cational attainment (the sample-line observations form a 1/330th sample). The regressions
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mates. Although the evidence is qualitatively consistent with the results
implied by the ordinary least-squares coefficients, the instrumental vari-
ables procedure leads to unstable results, with coefficients that fluctuate
dramatically across speciﬁcations and have very large standard errors. Part
of the problem is that the wage growth experienced by a particular state-
education group in decade τ – 1 may not be a valid instrument for the wage
growth in decade τ. In fact, there is only a very weak correlation in wage
growth across decades. The correlation between wage growth in a given
(j, k) cell across subsequent decades is –0.04.35 Because the log wage
index predicted from the first-stage regression is effectively constant
within state-education groups, the instrument has relatively little variance
relative to the error in the equation.36
Sensitivity of Regression Results
Because the analysis emphasizes the residential location decisions
made by immigrants, it is useful to account for some of the characteris-
tics that help differentiate the immigrant population in the United States.
As we have seen, immigrants tend to cluster in relatively few states, and
this clustering has been particularly pronounced in California. In 1990,
33.8 percent of immigrants resided in California, up from 14.6 percent in
1960. As shown in the last section, California tends to be a high-paying
state for all workers, regardless of their educational attainment. Suppose
that immigrants cluster in California simply because it is geographically
close to some important source countries (such as Mexico), or because it
offers amenities (such as a pleasant climate) that provide a more welcoming
George J. Borjas 99
estimated in the 1950 census use the sample weights provided in the data file. The log
wage regression in the 1950 census has 90,363 observations. Note further that the 1950 Pub-
lic Use Microdata Sample does not contain any information on wages for workers in Alaska
and Hawaii, which became states after 1950. As a result, the second-stage relative supply
regressions that use the instrumental variables procedure have 500 observations.
35. The correlation is +0.14 between 1950–60 and 1960–70, and –0.22 between 1960–70
and 1970–80. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) show that the correlation between wage
growth in 1970–80 and that in 1980–90 became much more negative than over previous
decades. It would be difﬁcult to justify the use of the previous decade’s wage growth as an
instrument for the current decade’s growth unless one can ﬁrst understand why the regional
wage structure changed in such a dramatic fashion during that period.
36. In addition, the predicted last period’s wage growth is highly collinear with the vec-
tor of education and state ﬁxed effects included in the ﬁrst-difference regression model.
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tive supplies of immigrants and interstate wage differences within a skill
group could then arise spuriously. The ﬁrst row of table 4, however, shows
that the empirical results are not affected when the relative supply regres-
sions exclude all state-education groups that refer to workers in California.
Even outside California, new immigrants are more sensitive to interstate
wage differentials than either earlier immigrants or natives.
One could also argue that the key results may be driven by the pre-
dominance of the Mexican population in the immigrant flow. In 1990
about 22 percent of immigrants living in the United States had been born
in Mexico, and 58 percent of these Mexican immigrants were living in
California, a state that offered relatively high wages. As the second and
third rows of table 4 show, the results are similar when the regressions
are reestimated in samples that either exclude Mexican immigrants or
exclude both Mexican immigrants and workers living in California.
It is also worth investigating whether the relative supply of immigrants
to particular states exhibits excess sensitivity even when we estimate the
models within particular national origin groups. To calculate the relative
supply indices in sufﬁciently large samples, the analysis must use broadly
defined groups, such as European immigrants, Asian immigrants, and
Latin American immigrants. The evidence obtained from these regres-
sions, however, is consistent with the basic thrust of the evidence. The
relative supply of new immigrants within these aggregated groups—even
when compared with the relative supply of their previously arrived com-
patriots—shows excess sensitivity to interstate wage differentials.
Finally, I have assumed throughout the analysis that newly arrived
immigrants can freely choose their residential location when they enter
the United States. One group of immigrants, however, has relatively little
choice over where to reside when they first enter the country, namely,
refugees. The U.S. Department of State assigns individual refugees to
sponsoring private voluntary agencies that provide them with a variety of
social services, including initial resettlement in the United States.37 These
sponsoring agencies determine the location of resettlement, which depends
partly on the match between a refugee’s socioeconomic background and
the availability of jobs and services in particular localities—as perceived
by the sponsoring agency. As a result, the initial location of refugees could
100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
37. U.S. Department of State (2000).
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paper, but it may not be. Unfortunately, the census does not contain any
information on the type of visa used by an individual to enter the United
States. To approximate the refugee population, therefore, I classify all
immigrants who originate in the main refugee-sending countries as
refugees and all other immigrants as nonrefugees.38
The last row of table 4 reports the coefﬁcients estimated from the sam-
ple of nonrefugees. The evidence clearly indicates that the location deci-
sion of nonrefugees is consistent with the hypothesis proposed in this
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38. Thirteen countries accounted for 90 percent of refugees awarded permanent resi-
dence status during the 1970s and 1980s: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Laos, Poland, Romania, Thailand, the Soviet Union, and
Vietnam.
Table 4. Robustness of Estimated Relative Supply Effect to Changes in Sample
Speciﬁcationa
Estimated coefﬁcient on log wage index
New 
Earlier New immigrants
Immigrants immigrants immigrants relative to
relative to relative to relative to earlier
Sample natives natives natives immigrants
Workers outside California 0.484 –0.689 1.642 2.272
(0.166) (0.172) (0.401) (0.488)
Natives and non-Mexican  0.811 –0.813 3.042 3.182
immigrants (0.210) (0.181) (0.503) (0.542)
Natives and non-Mexican  0.274 –0.889 1.949 3.400
immigrants outside  (0.158) (0.197) (0.430) (0.605)
California
Natives and European  –0.260 –0.882 1.847 2.253
immigrants (0.184) (0.204) (0.429) (0.675)
Natives and Asian immigrants 0.920 –0.711 1.372 1.568
(0.449) (0.532) (0.750) (0.980)
Natives and Hispanic  1.276 –0.275 1.616 2.446
immigrants (0.241) (0.430) (0.592) (0.965)
Natives and nonrefugee  0.522 –0.684 1.753 2.003
immigrants (0.246) (0.249) (0.344) (0.369)
Source: Author’s calculations using data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1950–90 Public Use Microdata
Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. Using the 1960–80 speciﬁcation with ﬁxed effects (see table 3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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wage states. It would be of interest to estimate the regression model in
the sample of refugees. The refugee population, however, is relatively
small, hovering around 10 percent of the immigrant population during
the period under study. The data lack sufficient variation, therefore, to
allow a full-scale study of the relationship between the location of refugees
(as chosen by the sponsoring agency) and interstate wage differentials.
Native Internal Migration
Up to this point, the empirical analysis has emphasized that the self-
selected sample of new immigrants is very responsive to interstate wage
differentials. In fact, the basic idea developed in this paper applies equally
well to the self-selected sample of native workers who choose to move
across states. Just as new immigrants should be clustered in the states that
offer the highest wages for their types of skills, so the self-selected sam-
ple of native movers should also be clustered in those states that offer the
highest wages for their skills.39
The census reports a worker’s state of residence five years before the
census date.40 One can then use these data to create two alternative samples
of natives: native movers, who moved across state lines during the relevant
five-year period, and native stayers, who remained in the same state over
the ﬁve-year period. It would seem ideal to replicate the regression analy-
sis in equation 18 by defining a new relative supply index that compares
the location decisions of the native movers with those of native stayers.
Unfortunately, this comparison is not quite right. Consider the data avail-
able for the 1980s. The 1980 log wage index was calculated using the 1980
census. The 1990 census provides the eventual geographic location of
native movers—as of 1990—for those natives who moved between 1985
and 1990. The sample of native stayers that can be defined in these data,
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39. This alternative test of the theory could help strengthen the argument that the results
reported in tables 3 and 4 cannot be attributed to a spurious correlation created by the pos-
sibility that immigrants tend to move to a few states, which just happen to offer relatively
high wages. Native movers, after all, do not typically move to the same six immigrant-
receiving states. Only 34.1 percent of natives who moved between 1985 and 1990 moved
to one of those states, compared with 74 percent of the new immigrant arrivals.
40. The 1980 census data contain information on place of residence in 1975 for only half
of the sample, randomly selected. The analysis summarized below, therefore, uses a 0.5 per-
cent random sample of native workers in 1980.
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who moved between 1980 and 1985 but did not move thereafter. In short,
the so-called sample of native stayers is contaminated by the presence of
some native movers.
In fact, the regression coefficients reported in the first data column of
table 5 suggest that native movers are less responsive to interstate wage
differences than native stayers. One can try to circumvent the measure-
ment problem by using alternative control groups. The second data column
of the table refines the definition of native stayers by estimating the rela-
tive supply index only in the subsample of stayers who are forty to fifty
years old—that is, among workers who are past their prime years for inter-
nal migration but before the retirement age. This subsample of stayers,
therefore, is likely to contain relatively few movers. In fact, there is now
a very weak positive correlation between the relative supply index and
relative wages in the fixed-effects specification, suggesting that native
movers are somewhat more likely to reside in those states that pay the
highest wages for the skills they have to offer.
One way of avoiding the measurement problem altogether is simply to
ignore the group of native stayers and compare the native movers with
immigrants. The third data column of table 5 defines the relative supply
index by contrasting the location decisions of native movers with those of
earlier immigrants. As long as there are substantial migration costs, the
sample of earlier immigrants is “stuck” in the states where they ﬁrst entered
the United States, so that this sample approximates an immobile native
sample. Table 5 reports that the relative supply of native movers is more
sensitive to interstate wage differentials than that of the earlier immigrants.
Finally, one can also define the relative supply index by contrasting
the location of native movers with that of newly arrived immigrants. If
the two groups were equally responsive to interstate wage differentials, the
estimated impact of the log wage index would be zero. The regression
coefﬁcient, however, is negative and signiﬁcant when the ﬁxed effects are
included, indicating that newly arrived immigrants are more responsive
to interstate wage differentials than the self-selected sample of native
movers.
Overall, the evidence reported in table 5 does not support the hypothe-
sis that native movers behave “just like” new immigrants. Part of the prob-
lem arises from the data: the construction of the census data prevents the
correct calculation of the relevant group of native stayers. It may also be
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that native movers are income maximizers. The available evidence in the
internal migration literature suggests that natives respond to interstate
wage differentials and move to high-wage states. However, much of this
evidence is somewhat dated and does not directly address the possibility
that, in recent years, net native migration to Sunbelt states may have been
motivated by reasons other than income maximization.41 This possibility
increases the importance of immigrant ﬂows in arbitraging regional wage
differentials.
Between 1985 and 1990, 10.9 million native workers (11.0 percent of
the native work force) moved across state lines. During the same period,
880,000 “preexisting” immigrants (11.3 percent of the immigrants who
arrived before 1985) also moved across state lines.42 Finally, 2.1 million
new immigrant workers entered the U.S. labor market during the same
period. The new immigrants, therefore, accounted for 15.1 percent of all
workers who moved across state lines between 1985 and 1990, even
though these workers accounted for only 1.9 percent of the work force in
1990. The ﬂow of new immigrants into the United States, therefore, has a
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41. Greenwood (1997) surveys the extensive internal migration literature.
42. Bartel (1989), in a study of the internal migration decisions of immigrants, concludes
that immigrants enter the United States through a limited number of gateway cities and
that their subsequent internal migration within the United States is not very sensitive to
regional wage differentials.
Table 5. Estimating the Sensitivity of Relative Labor Supply of Native Internal
Migrants to Interstate Wage Differencesa
Estimated coefﬁcient on log wage index
Native Native Native Native
movers movers movers movers
relative to relative to relative to relative to
native older native earlier new
Speciﬁcation  “stayers”“ stayers” immigrants immigrants
Without ﬁxed effects –1.064 –1.280 3.421 –9.919
(0.184) (0.236) (1.895) (7.406)
With ﬁxed effects –1.372 0.517 3.716 –22.005
(0.221) (0.441) (2.406) (9.478)
Source: Author’s calculations using data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1960–90 Public Use Microdata
Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. Using the 1960–80 specification with fixed effects (see table 3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Older native
“stayers” are those aged forty to fifty. New immigrants are those entering the United States within five years after the log wage
index is measured; earlier immigrants have been in the country for at least ﬁve years.
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even if all native movers are income maximizing when making their
migration decisions. The new immigrants make up many of the marginal
workers whose location decisions help equilibrate the national labor mar-
ket and improve labor market efﬁciency.
Immigration and Wage Convergence
The labor supply responses documented in the previous section sug-
gest that the geographic distribution of new immigrants in the United
States should help reduce regional wage differentials. This ﬁnding has sig-
nificant macroeconomic implications, for it suggests that regional wage
convergence will be faster among those skill groups and in those periods
that experience high levels of immigration.
A large literature examines the rate of wage convergence across states
in the United States.43 These studies typically estimate the generic regres-
sion model
where wjt is the wage in state j at time t, and β is the convergence coeffi-
cient, which will be negative if there is wage convergence across states.
The values of β (measured at an annual rate) estimated in the literature
range around –0.02, suggesting that the half-life of interstate wage differ-
entials is roughly thirty-ﬁve years.44The hypothesis examined in this paper
() l n – ln ln , , 19 1 ww w j t jt jt jt + =+ + αβ ε
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43. See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992); Blanchard and Katz (1992).
44. To derive the steady-state level of income in the national economy, we can write the
difference equation 19 in terms of the initial wage in the state. Ignoring the subscript j, the
wage at time t is
ln w(t) = α[1 + (1 + β) + (1 + β)2 + … + (1 + β)t–1] + (1 + β)t ln w(0),
where ln w(0) is the logarithm of the initial wage. The steady-state wage is obtained by let-
ting t →∞ . It is given by ln w* = –α/β. One can then write the current period wage as
ln w(t) = [1 – (1 + β)t] ln w* + (1 + β)t ln w(0).
The initial log wage gap has been cut by half when ln w(t) is the simple average of ln w* and
ln w(0). This implies that the half-life can be calculated from the equation (1 + β)t = 0.5. The
time required to cut the initial wage gap in half is then given by t* ≈ –ln 2/β.
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in any particular labor market and the size of the immigrant ﬂow into that
market between periods t and t + 1.
I use data drawn from the 1950–90 censuses to estimate a particular
speciﬁcation of the regression model in equation 19. Recall that my empir-
ical framework has differentiated across skill groups throughout the analy-
sis. Consider the following convergence regression model:
(20) vjk, t+1 – vjkt = αkt + βktvjkt + εjkt,
where vjk(t) is the log wage index estimated for workers in state j and skill
group k in census year t, and the parameter βkt is the convergence coeffi-
cient describing the evolution of the regional wage structure for that skill
group in the (t, t + 1) time period. I annualized the dependent variable by
dividing by ten, so that β gives the annual rate of regional wage conver-
gence. I estimated the regression model in equation 20 separately for each
skill group in each time period 1950–60, 1960–70, 1970–80, and 1980–90.
The empirical analysis, therefore, yields a total of twenty estimated con-
vergence coefﬁcients (ﬁve education groups over four periods).
Table 6 summarizes the convergence coefﬁcients estimated for each of
the cells. Sixteen of the coefﬁcients are negative, and only one of the four
positive coefficients is significantly different from zero. The mean con-
vergence coefficient (weighted by the inverse of the square of the stan-
dard error) is –0.02, which is quite similar to the “consensus” convergence
coefﬁcient reported in the literature.
The hypothesis developed in this paper suggests that there should be
greater wage convergence in those labor markets (defined for a particular
skill group over a particular time period) that experience larger immi-
grant flows. Let the index of immigrant penetration in a particular labor
market be given by
where Mk(t, t + 1) is the total number of immigrants in skill group k who
entered the United States between periods t and t + 1, and Nkt is the native-
born population in skill group k at the beginning of the period. I then test
the theoretical implication that high immigration leads to faster wage
convergence by estimating the following second-stage regression model:
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I weight the regression by the inverse of the square of the standard error.
This procedure helps adjust for any potential heteroskedasticity in the
disturbance.
Figure 5 presents a scatter diagram illustrating the basic data available
for the second-stage regression. (The area of the circles corresponds to
the weights of the convergence coefficients as described above.) There is a
() . 22 βξ kt kt t ab g =+ +
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Table 6. Estimated Wage Convergence and Immigrant Penetration, by 
Educational Attainment
Decade and  Convergence  Standard  Immigrant 
educational attainment coefﬁcienta error penetrationb
1950–60
Less than nine years 0.004 0.004 –4.231
Nine to eleven years 0.009 0.006 –4.320
Twelve years –0.004 0.004 –4.316
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years –0.014 0.007 –3.836
At least sixteen years –0.030 0.006 –3.633
1960–70
Less than nine years –0.025 0.003 –3.574
Nine to eleven years –0.022 0.003 –4.233
Twelve years –0.016 0.004 –3.987
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years –0.005 0.005 –3.547
At least sixteen years –0.004 0.006 –3.123
1970–80
Less than nine years –0.040 0.003 –2.625
Nine to eleven years –0.046 0.004 –3.723
Twelve years –0.037 0.005 –3.764
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years –0.045 0.005 –3.069
At least sixteen years –0.037 0.004 –2.720
1980–90
Less than nine years –0.018 0.008 –1.821
Nine to eleven years –0.008 0.014 –2.784
Twelve years –0.002 0.015 –3.658
Thirteen to ﬁfteen years 0.014 0.015 –2.898
At least sixteen years 0.023 0.011 –2.693
Sample mean, 1950–90 –0.022 n.a. –3.571
Source: Author’s calculations using data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1950–90 Public Use Microdata
Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. Estimated by equation 20 and weighted by (n0
–1 + n1
–1)
–1, where nt gives the number of observations for the state-education
group in year t.
b. Measured as the log ratio of the total number of immigrants in a particular skill group who entered the United States over
the sample period to the size of the native-born population in that skill group at the beginning of the period.
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in any particular market (defined by time period and skill group) and the
relative number of immigrants entering that labor market. Table 7 reports
the results of estimating the basic regression models on these data. The
simplest specification, reported in the first row, takes each of the twenty
labor markets as independent observations; a numerically strong and sta-
tistically significant correlation is found between convergence and immi-
gration.
To illustrate the magnitude of the correlation, consider the following
thought experiment. Suppose the convergence coefﬁcient is on the order of
–0.02, implying a half-life of regional wage differences of thirty-ﬁve years.
In the 1950s the average value of mk (across skill groups) was equal to
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Figure 5. Relationship between Wage Convergence and Immigrant Penetration,
1950–90
Source: Author’s calculations based on data for persons aged eighteen to ﬁfty-nine from the 1950–90 Public Use Microdata Sam-
ples of the U.S. Census.
a. Each circle represents a convergence coefficient estimated in a particular decade for a particular skill group. Estimates are
weighted by the inverse of the square of the standard error of the convergence coefficient; the larger the area of the circle, the
larger the weight of that estimate in the regression.
b. Immigrant penetration is measured as the log ratio of the number of immigrants in a particular skill group who arrived dur-
ing a particular decade to the number of natives in that skill group at the beginning of the decade.
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0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 108–4.1. Put differently, immigration during this decade increased labor sup-
ply by around 1.6 percent. By the 1980s the average value of mk was –2.5,
and total immigration increased labor supply by around 9.8 percent. The
magnitude of the coefficient b in equation 22 (b = –0.013) implies that this
increase in immigration would lower the convergence coefﬁcient by 0.021
unit, or from –0.02 to –0.04. The half-life of interstate wage differentials
would then be cut in half, to 17.3 years. Immigration, therefore, seems to
signiﬁcantly speed up the process of wage convergence. And this speeding
up occurs precisely because immigration introduces into the U.S. labor
market a sizable group of persons who are particularly responsive to inter-
state wage differentials.
The remaining rows of table 7 show estimates of the basic second-
stage model using increasingly general specifications. The second row, for
example, adds education fixed effects to the basic model. The addition of
these education fixed effects implies that the relationship between wage
convergence and immigration is now being estimated within education
groups—identifying the impact of immigration from the time variation in
the size of the immigrant ﬂow for a particular skill group. The coefﬁcient
b remains negative and is actually larger, again suggesting that immigra-
tion plays an important role in determining the speed of wage convergence
in the U.S. labor market.
The last row of table 7 adds variables indicating period ﬁxed effects (that
is, the decade in which the convergence coefficient was estimated). The
coefficient b remains negative, but it is no longer statistically (or numeri-
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Table 7. Explaining Wage Convergence with Immigrant Penetrationa
Coefﬁcient on 
immigrant 
Speciﬁcation penetrationb R2 No. of observations
Without ﬁxed effects –0.013 0.229 20
(0.006)
With education ﬁxed effects –0.021 0.366 20
(0.008)
With education and period ﬁxed effects –0.001 0.753 20
(0.005)
Source: Author’s calculations using data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1950–90 Public Use Microdata
Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. The dependent variable for each speciﬁcation is the convergence coefﬁcient estimated in a particular decade for a particular
skill group (see table 6). The independent variable is the measure of immigrant penetration for that decade and skill group. Stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of the square of the standard error of the estimated
convergence coefﬁcient.
b. See table 6.
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 109cally) signiﬁcant. This is not too surprising, since there is little variation left
in the sample of twenty convergence rates to identify the relationship
between immigration and the speed of wage convergence.
Overall, the empirical analysis of interstate wage convergence yields
results consistent with the key hypothesis of this paper. Immigration
greases the wheels of the labor market by introducing workers who are
very responsive to regional wage differentials into the host country’s labor
market. As a result, immigrants speed up the process of wage conver-
gence and improve labor market efﬁciency.
Estimating the Efﬁciency Gain
Equation 14 defined the efficiency gain from immigration as the net
increase in GDP accruing to natives that results from the clustering of
immigrants in high-wage regions relative to what would have been
observed if immigrants had simply replicated the geographic sorting of the
native population. The calculation of the efﬁciency gain requires that I ﬁrst
specify how natives respond to regional wage differentials. In particular,
how would the regional wage structure have evolved in the absence of
immigration? And how do natives respond to the entry of immigrants in
different markets?
The speed of adjustment by natives plays an important role in calcula-
tions of the efficiency gain. Suppose, for example, that natives are very
responsive to regional wage differentials and that migration costs are rela-
tively low. Then the entry of M immigrants into the high-wage region
generates only a short-run efficiency gain, because natives would have
eliminated the wage gap between the two regions quickly and at very low
cost. In this scenario the fact that immigration greases the wheels of the
labor market is unlikely to play an important role in a cost-benefit analy-
sis of immigration. If, however, migration costs are relatively high, and rela-
tively few natives move across regions, the efficiency gain generated by
immigration could be sizable and long lasting.
A simple model helps to formalize these ideas.45 Suppose the United
States has two regions (j = 1, 2) and that the production function is the
same in each:
110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
45. The framework is a special case of the multisector migration model presented in Bor-
jas (1999b).
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and β < 1. The regional labor demand function implied by this technol-
ogy is
(24) ln wjt = α – δ ln Ljt , 
where wjt is the wage in region j at time t, and δ = 1 – β > 0. A fraction
λ < 0.5 of the native population lives in region 1 at time 0. The total num-
ber of native workers in the labor market, N = L10 + L20, is assumed ﬁxed.
The wage gap between the two regions before any immigrants enter the
economy is
Suppose that the United States admits M immigrants at the end of time
0 and that a fraction θ of these immigrants settle in region 1. The num-
bers of immigrants who settle in regions 1 and 2, respectively, are given by
As before, the parameters k and θ help to measure the extent to which
immigrants arbitrage wage opportunities across the two labor markets. In
the special case of k = 1, the immigrant ﬂow is sufﬁciently large to poten-
tially bring the two labor markets into a single-wage equilibrium without
any native internal migration. If all of these immigrants settled in the high-
wage region, so that θ is also equal to 1, immigration would be “complete”
and would bring about an immediate equalization of wages across regions.
Regional wage differentials induce a supply response in the native-born
population, but this response occurs with a lag. For simplicity, assume that
only natives move across regions and that their supply response is
described by the following lagged adjustment function:
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0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 111where σ≥0 is the labor supply elasticity. In other words, the rate of change
in the regional allocation of labor between times t and t + 1 depends on
the regional wage gap at time t.
Some tedious algebra reveals that the adjustment mechanism in equa-
tion 28 implies that the regional employment and wage differentials at time
t are given by
I assume that 0 < (1 – δσ) < 1 so that the national labor market converges
to a single-wage equilibrium over time.
Finally, it is costly for natives to engage in internal migration. Suppose
that these migration costs at time t are given by the following quadratic
cost function:46
where Rt gives the number of natives who move at time t. It is easy to show
that the number of internal migrants is approximated by47
The present value of GDP accruing to natives, net of migration costs,
is given by
where r is the rate of discount. Let QNθ=1 be the net income accruing to
natives if immigrants are income maximizers and cluster in the high-wage
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46. The quadratic cost function implies that it is very expensive for all natives to move at
the same time. The increasing marginal cost of migration can be justified if there are limited
resources to facilitate the geographic move, and if rising demand for internal migration leads
to more congestion and hence higher costs for the marginal internal migrant. 
47. Note that ln (L2/L1) ≈ (L2 – L1)/0.5(L1 + L2). Equation 32 follows from applying this
approximation to the lagged adjustment function in equation 28. 
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graphic sorting of the native population. The measure of the efﬁciency gain
from immigration defined earlier is simply the difference between these
two quantities.
The magnitude of the efﬁciency gain will obviously depend on the value
of the supply elasticity σ. Rather than assume a particular numerical value,
I build into the simulation a behavioral assumption about native migration.
Suppose that native migration decisions are efﬁcient, in the sense that native
migration maximizes the value of national income accruing to natives, net
of migration costs. It is well known that if natives have perfect foresight and
the migration response by native workers is efficient, the quadratic cost
function leads to the lagged adjustment function in equation 28.48 The sup-
ply elasticity σ is then a sufﬁcient statistic to summarize how native migra-
tion responds optimally to changes in the regional wage gap. The
assumption of efficient migration greatly simplifies the estimation of the
efficiency gain that accrues to natives. The annualized efficiency gain is
given by49
where σ1 is the supply elasticity measuring optimal native migration
behavior when all of the immigrants choose to live in the high-wage
region, and σλis that elasticity when a fraction λ of the immigrants choose
to live in the high-wage region. The separate maximization of each stream
of national income ensures that the “right” number of natives move in each
period under either regime.
Table 8 reports estimates of ∆N for alternative values of the parameters.50
The table also reports the supply elasticities that maximize the efficiency
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48. Gould (1968); Hamermesh (1993). The rate of change of employment in the dynamic
model of labor demand with quadratic adjustment costs is dEt/dt = κ(E* – Et), where E*
gives steady-state employment and Et gives employment at time t. The alternative defini-
tion of Rt given in equation 32 implies that Rt – Rt–1 = –δσRt–1. This relationship is identical
to that implied by the dynamic model of labor demand because the steady-state value of
R* is zero. 
49. This comparison is related to the discussion in the trade literature that analyzes the
optimal timing of trade liberalizations; see Lapan (1976) and Mussa (1986).
50. The algebraic structure of the model does not lead to a closed-form solution for the
maximization problem in equation 34. The simulation conducts the maximization by cal-
culating the efficiency gain under each regime for many alternative values of σ, and then
choosing the value of the elasticity that maximizes the net gain.
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 113gain in equation 34. All of the simulations assume that the real rate of
interest is 3 percent, that the parameter β is 0.7 (so that the elasticity δ in
the labor demand function is 0.3), that there are 100 million native work-
ers in the economy, and that GDP in the preimmigration regime is $10 tril-
lion.51 Finally, the relation between the immigrant share of the work force
(m = M/N) and the fraction of natives who reside in region 1 is
(35) m = k(1 – 2λ).
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
51. The assumption that δ = 0.3 is consistent with the evidence summarized in Hamer-
mesh’s (1993) survey of the labor demand literature.
Table 8. Estimates of Efﬁciency Gains from Immigration Accruing to Natives under
Selected Parameter Values
Initial regional wage gapa
Item Low (0.06) Moderate (0.12) Sizable (0.25)
Parameter
λb 0.45 0.40 0.30
kc 1.00 0.50 0.25
Low migration costd
Net efﬁciency gaine 2.7 4.7 6.9
σ1
f 0.0 0.6 0.4
σλ
g 0.3 0.3 0.3
Medium migration cost
Net efﬁciency gain 3.5 6.1 9.0
σ1 0.0 0.4 0.3
σλ 0.2 0.2 0.2
High migration cost
Net efﬁciency gain 4.6 7.9 12.4
σ1 0.0 0.3 0.2
σλ 0.1 0.1 0.1
Prohibitive migration cost
Net efﬁciency gain 10.3 13.2 22.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on the theoretical model.
a. Difference in the log wage index before immigration.
b. The fraction of natives that live in the high-wage region.
c. The size of the immigrant ﬂow relative to the supply imbalance between the two regions.
d. Average cost of migration equals half of annual income. For medium cost, average cost of migration equals annual income,
and for high cost it equals twice annual income.
e. Efficiency gain (in billions of dollars) accruing to natives is the difference between the income that accrues to natives if all
immigrants settle in the high-wage region and that if immigrants replicate the geographical distribution of the native population.
f. The supply elasticity that maximizes native income (net of migration costs) when immigrants cluster in the high-wage region.
g. The optimal supply elasticity when immigrants replicate the initial native geographical distribution.
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gration increases labor supply by 10 percent. This assumption greatly
restricts the range of valid values for k and λ.
Suppose that λ = 0.4 (or, equivalently, that k = 0.5), so that 40 percent
of natives live in the high-wage region, and that the observed volume of
immigration is half as large as required to bring about an immediate equal-
ization of wages across regions. In this scenario the initial wage gap
between the two regions is 12.2 percent. The simulations in table 8 then
indicate that the efficiency gain accruing to natives is modest. Consider
first the case where natives are immobile, so that the supply elasticity of
natives is set to zero, regardless of how many immigrants enter the coun-
try and where they settle. The last panel of the table shows that the annual
efﬁciency gain from immigration is $13.2 billion. 
Suppose now that immigration costs are “low,” in the sense that the
average cost of a native moving from region 2 to region 1 is half the
income per worker in the country ($35,000).52The efﬁciency gain accruing
to natives falls to $4.7 billion. The efficiency gain is now relatively small
because the low migration costs imply that natives would have quickly
moved across regions anyway, so that there is little to be gained from
immigration. The efﬁciency gain accruing to natives increases to $7.9 bil-
lion when migration costs are “high,” in the sense that the migration cost
per worker, on average, is twice as large as income per worker.
The efficiency gains are substantially larger when there is a larger
regional wage gap in the preimmigration period, that is, when income-
maximizing immigrants have the most to contribute to the narrowing of
regional wage differences. Consider, for instance, the situation when λ =
0.3, so that the initial wage gap between the two regions is 25.4 percent.
The efﬁciency gain accruing to natives is now approximately twice that cal-
culated when the preimmigration regional wage gap was only 12.2 per-
cent, and ranges from $6.9 billion to $12.4 billion annually.
Although these efﬁciency gains are trivial in the context of a $10 trillion
economy, they are not trivial when compared with the traditional immi-
gration surplus stressed in earlier calculations. After all, the efﬁciency gain
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52. The assumption that β = 0.7 implies that 70 percent of the $10 trillion in national
income accrues to workers. Since there are 100 million workers, income per worker equals
$70,000. Equation 31 implies that the average cost of migration equals φR. I obtain the value
of φ by evaluating the expression for average costs at the point that would be observed if
1 percent of native workers (or 1 million workers) migrated in any particular year.
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 115measured here accrues to natives in addition to the immigration surplus
that arises from having more workers in an economy with a fixed (and
native-owned) capital stock. The efficiency gain from immigration mea-
sures how much a fixed volume of immigration increases native income
simply because the immigrants tend to cluster in the high-wage region.
As I showed earlier, the immigration surplus is approximately $10 billion
when the factor price elasticity is 0.3. It turns out that the estimates of the
efﬁciency gain roughly double the measured beneﬁts from immigration.
The simulations reported in table 8 may be unsatisfactory in one impor-
tant way. As noted above, many studies in the wage convergence litera-
ture report that the half-life of differences in income per capita across U.S.
states is around thirty years. It turns out, however, that the assumption of
efficient migration built into the simulations implies a faster rate of con-
vergence. The simulations yield an estimate of σ1 (the supply elasticity
when all immigrants cluster in the high-wage region) of 0.3 to 0.4 in the
medium-cost scenario. This supply elasticity, in turn, implies that the half-
life of the initial wage gap is around ﬁve to seven years.53
Suppose that the empirical ﬁnding of a thirty-year half-life for regional
wage differences is correct. The simplest explanation of the inconsistency
between the simulations and this empirical finding is that migration costs
are far higher than assumed in the calculations.54 In fact, the exercise
would generate a half-life of thirty years if I assumed that the average
migration cost was around three times income per worker, or $210,000.
Although this estimate of migration costs may seem implausible, it is less
so when viewed in the context of actual migration ﬂows across regions or
countries. Consider, for example, the migration ﬂow between Puerto Rico
and the United States. Although there are no legal restrictions on the move-
ment of Puerto Ricans to the U.S. mainland, a large income gap has per-
sisted between these two regions for many decades.55 The Penn World
Tables report that in 1955 (chain-indexed) GDP per capita in the United
States was four times as large as in Puerto Rico. Even by 1999, GDP per
116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
53. Equations 25 and 30 indicate that the regional wage gap has been cut in half when
(1 – δσ)t = 0.5. The implied half-life is then given by t* = ln 0.5/ln (1 – δσ).
54. It is also possible that native migration is inefficient because it fails to maximize
native income net of migration costs.
55. Fitzpatrick (1971) gives a comprehensive history of the population flow between
Puerto Rico and the United States.
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 116capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, was still 3.5 times as large
in the United States.
Not surprisingly, many Puerto Ricans have taken advantage of the huge
income gap over the decades. Nearly 25 percent of Puerto Ricans migrated
to the United States between the 1940s and the 1980s.56 However, the inter-
esting question is not why 25 percent of Puerto Ricans chose to migrate, but
why 75 percent of Puerto Ricans chose not to. The Puerto Rican case, I con-
jecture, strongly suggests that migration costs could easily swamp income
differentials that are perhaps on the order of three- to fourfold.
Of course, smaller income gaps across countries would induce even less
migration. The recent experience of the European Union, as it extended
membership to such low-wage countries as Spain and Portugal, is instruc-
tive. In 1990, for instance, GDP per capita in France was 80 percent
greater than that in Greece, 70 percent greater than in Portugal, and 44 per-
cent greater than in Spain.57Yet despite much concern that the accession of
Greece, Portugal, and Spain into the European Union might generate sub-
stantial migration ﬂows, these ﬂows never materialized.
Consider, for example, what happened to migration to Germany—one of
the EU countries with the highest GDP per capita—after the initial expansion.
The number of Greek nationals living in Germany grew from 356,000 to
363,000 between 1994 and 1996, the number of Spanish nationals remained
at about 132,000, and the number of Portuguese nationals grew from 118,000
to 131,000.58And the number of foreign-born nationals from the acceding
countries was roughly stable in the other EU countries. It seems, therefore,
that the income differences between the original EU countries and the initial
wave of acceding countries, large as they were, were not sufﬁciently large to
generate substantial migration ﬂows. In short, there is strong circumstantial
evidence suggesting that migration costs play a crucial role in inhibiting labor
ﬂows across regions or countries. This fact, of course, increases the impor-
tance of immigration as grease on the wheels of the labor market of the host
country’s economy.
In the end, the hypothesis of efficient migration, and its link to migra-
tion costs and the actual size of population flows across regions, raises a
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56. Ramos (1992).
57. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998.
58. Fröhlich (1997, p. 6).
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tion, questions that remain unexplored in a literature that seems ripe for
rediscovery. 
Conclusion
Migration costs prevent many native-born workers from moving to
those states that offer the best economic opportunities. Immigrant workers,
in contrast, form a self-selected sample of persons who have chosen to
incur those migration costs. As long as migration costs are mainly fixed
costs, newly arrived immigrants in the United States will choose to live in
those states that offer them the best economic opportunities. As a result,
new immigrants should be clustered in those states that offer them the
highest wages, and the location decisions of immigrant workers should
be much more responsive to interstate wage differentials than those of
natives.
This paper has tested this hypothesis using data drawn from the decen-
nial censuses. The evidence indicates that new immigrants do indeed make
different location decisions than native workers and than earlier immi-
grants. Moreover, these differences are strongly related to interstate wage
differences within a particular skill group. In other words, new immigrants
who have particular skills to offer are more likely to reside in those states
that happen to offer the highest wages for those skills. The endogenous
sorting of newly arrived immigrants to high-wage areas, in fact, speeds
up the process of regional wage convergence.
The empirical evidence, therefore, suggests that immigrants may play
an important—and neglected—role in the U.S. economy: They make up a
disproportionately large fraction of the marginal workers whose location
decisions arbitrage differences across labor markets. Put differently, immi-
gration improves labor market efﬁciency. Moreover, it turns out that part of
this efﬁciency gain accrues to natives, suggesting that existing estimates of
the benefits from immigration may be ignoring a potentially important
source of these beneﬁts. However, a back-of-the-envelope calculation sug-
gests that the efﬁciency gain is probably below $10 billion a year.
The analysis also has provocative implications for the interpretation of
studies that analyze how immigration affects the labor market opportuni-
ties of native workers. Most studies in this literature attempt to estimate the
118 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
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ferent geographic areas and relating these geographic differences to mea-
sures of immigrant penetration in the local labor markets.
Because immigrants deliberately choose to enter those labor markets
that offer the highest wages, it will be very difficult to document that
increased immigration lowers the native wage in the penetrated geographic
areas. The literature has typically attempted to control for this endogene-
ity problem by using instrumental variables, where the instrument for the
measure of immigrant penetration in the local labor market is typically a
variable indicating the number of immigrants who resided in that labor
market at some point in the past. The evidence presented in this paper
suggests that this is not a valid instrument. Immigrants cluster in those
labor markets that offer them the best opportunities for the skills that they
bring to the country, and hence the size of the preexisting stock of immi-
grants will not, in general, be uncorrelated with the wages offered by a par-
ticular locality.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that there is much left to
learn about the macroeconomic consequences of immigration. For the
most part, the immigration literature in labor economics evaluates vari-
ous aspects of the microeconomic impact of immigration or measures how
immigrants perform in the host country’s labor market. The fact that immi-
gration speeds up the process of wage convergence raises a number of new
questions, such as the link between immigration and economic growth,
that deserve careful empirical investigation.
Finally, most of the studies in the immigration literature emphasize
some measure of the cost that immigrants impose on various sectors of
the host country’s economy—whether they be the wage losses suffered
by native workers or the increase in taxes borne by native taxpayers.
Remarkably little attention has been paid to the possibility that immigrants
impart a variety of beneﬁts to the host country’s economy. A great deal of
research remains to be done to better understand the source and magnitude
of these beneﬁts.
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Discussion
Robert Shimer: George Borjas has written an ambitious paper, presenting
some new empirical ﬁndings and developing a framework for quantifying
the efficiency gains from immigration. The paper begins by documenting
that immigrants tend to move to states where workers with their skills earn
high wages. It then argues that the resulting increase in labor supply in
high-wage states accelerates the convergence of wages across states. And
finally it claims that the efficiency gain from immigration roughly equals
conventional estimates of the immigration surplus. The bulk of my dis-
cussion will ask whether we should accept each of these findings. The
short answer is that immigrants do move to high-wage states but, surpris-
ingly, that native migrants do not—a piece of evidence that is inconsis-
tent with Borjas’s framework. The support for the other empirical result,
that migration compresses interstate wage differentials, thereby generating
an efﬁciency gain from immigration, is weak.
To analyze whether immigrants move to states where workers with their
skills earn high wages, Borjas proceeds in two stages. First, he uses decen-
nial census data on native-born workers to estimate the average wage that
workers with a given skill level, as proxied by their educational attainment,
earn in each state conditional on their age and sex. The paper implicitly
maintains the hypothesis that these interstate wage differentials do not
simply proxy for the unobserved characteristics of workers in different
states. This implies that a worker who moves to a high-wage state can
expect to earn a higher wage than he or she would have earned in a low-
wage state.
In the second stage, Borjas examines whether immigrants’ location
decisions respond to wage differentials. If they do, we should see a large
120
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ing a high level of wages in that group. Borjas runs the appropriate regres-
sion in ﬁrst differences (his tables 3 and 4), but he provided me with some
additional results in terms of levels, which I ﬁnd easier to interpret. Some
of those results are shown in table 1 below. A state-education group with
10 percent higher wages than the average draws a 29 percent larger relative
supply of immigrants than of natives. Comparing the second and third
columns, we see that the effect is slightly stronger on new immigrants than
on earlier ones. Since these regressions include state fixed effects, they
do not just say that immigrants move to California, Florida, and New York,
which happen to be high-wage states. Rather, states that pay relatively high
wages to college graduates tend to draw a lot of college graduates relative
to high school graduates.
The finding that both old and new immigrants tend to reside in high-
wage states might appear inconsistent with the findings in Borjas’s first-
difference regressions, where he shows that an increase in wages attracts
new immigrants but not old ones. The very slow convergence of wages
across states reconciles these results. A highly educated immigrant drawn
to New York in 1950 would continue to earn high wages in New York
throughout the sample period. Thus these regressions support Borjas’s
model of immigrants’location decisions.
Borjas notes that what is true for immigrants should also be true for
native migrants. Any worker who moves should move to a high-wage state,
regardless of whether he or she came from another state or another coun-
try. His table 5 shows that this is not the case. The most straightforward
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Table 1. Estimating the Sensitivity of Relative Labor Supply of Immigrants to
Interstate Wage Differences, in Levelsa
Estimated coefﬁcient on log wage index
New  
Earlier New  immigrants
Immigrants immigrants immigrants relative  to
relative to relative to relative to earlier
Sample natives natives natives immigrants
1960–80 2.905 2.343 3.208 0.200
(0.083) (0.333) (0.437) (0.235)
Source: Calculations by George Borjas using data for persons aged eighteen to fifty-nine from the 1950–90 Public Use
Microdata Samples of the U.S. Census.
a. The dependent variable is the relative supply index over 1960–80. The independent variable is the log wage index. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions include time, education, and state fixed effects and are weighted by (n0
–1 + n1
–1)–1,
where nt gives the number of observations for the state-education group in year t.
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move to low-wage states. This effect is large in magnitude and very sig-
nificant, with a t statistic in excess of –6. Constructing the data in other
ways, Borjas cannot reject the null hypothesis that native movers, native
stayers, and earlier immigrants live in the same places—that is, that native
movers do not seek out high-wage states. This is a puzzle.
My prior belief was that natives would be drawn toward high-wage
states at least as much as immigrants. Native migrants have better infor-
mation about wages in different states. They are less tied by linguistic
barriers to a small subset of locations. Moreover, we know from work by
Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz that regions in the United States
respond to adverse shocks through emigration.1 Perhaps most relevant,
under the maintained hypothesis that interstate wage differentials do not
reﬂect unobserved heterogeneity, native migrants are throwing away a lot
of income. According to Borjas, the mean college graduate living in
Wyoming in 1980, the state at the 20th percentile of the wage distribu-
tion, earned 17 percent less than the mean college graduate living in
Nevada, the state at the 80th percentile of the distribution. Even if this
wage differential decays at 2 percent a year, a migrant with a forty-year
time horizon and a 4 percent discount rate would earn 2.6 years extra
income in present value terms by moving to Nevada rather than staying
in Wyoming.
One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that the maintained hypoth-
esis is incorrect. An alternative hypothesis is that state-level wage differ-
entials entirely reflect the unobserved characteristics of workers in
different states. In that case a migrant with a given set of characteristics
would not enjoy any wage increase upon moving to a high-wage state,
and so would not be attracted to such a state. The problem is that although
this can explain why native migrants do not move to high-wage states, it
is inconsistent with the evidence that immigrants do in fact move to such
states, and it cannot explain why native migrants move to low-wage states.
The simplest reconciliation of these findings is that natives are moving
away from states that attract immigrants with similar skills. If in fact the
role of unobserved heterogeneity lies somewhere in between that assumed
in the maintained and alternative hypotheses, natives need not be giving up
that much income through this behavior.
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cial for quantifying the efﬁciency gains from immigration. Most obviously,
the more that unmeasured heterogeneity accounts for interstate wage dif-
ferentials, the less will be the efficiency gain from equalizing productiv-
ity across regions. Additionally, if we know what fraction of measured
wage differentials can be recovered by moving to a high-wage state, we
can estimate the mobility cost of the marginal native worker who chooses
to move to such a state. As Borjas shows, high mobility costs raise the efﬁ-
ciency gains from immigration, since immigrants rather than native
migrants incur the cost of equalizing wages across regions.
In any case, the failure of native migration to eliminate wage differen-
tials leaves a qualitative role for immigrants to grease the wheels of the
labor market by moving to high-wage states and erasing interstate wage
differentials. To see whether this occurs, Borjas estimates β-convergence
coefﬁcients for native wages over four different decades and for ﬁve edu-
cation groups. He then regresses these twenty data points on a measure of
immigrant penetration in each labor market, weighting the regression by
the inverse of the standard error of the estimate of the β-convergence
coefﬁcients.
His table 7 presents some evidence that higher immigrant penetration
raises the speed of convergence, but the ﬁnding is weak in several respects.
First, the β-convergence coefficients are almost certainly measured with
error. If the wage level in a state is overestimated in year t, for example, the
state will appear to be growing at a slower rate between t and t + 1, mis-
leading the econometrician into finding evidence of convergence. The
regression of convergence coefﬁcients on immigrant penetration will then
yield biased estimates if measurement error is worse for education-year
groups with more immigrant penetration. The second problem is that there
are only twenty data points, and a few of them, in particular the least edu-
cated workers in 1980, seem to be driving the results. The finding goes
away in an unweighted ordinary least-squares regression. It also goes away
when a time trend or year fixed effects are added to the weighted least-
squares regression (with or without the education ﬁxed effects). For these
reasons, the correlation between convergence and immigrant penetration is
weak at best.
Even with more and better-quality data, I would be surprised if one
found that higher immigrant penetration significantly raises the speed of
convergence. Immigrants have been moving to high-wage states for years
George J. Borjas 123
0099—02 BPEA /Borjas  7/3/01  12:16  Page 123without appreciably mitigating wage dispersion. For example, Borjas,
George Freeman, and Katz ﬁnd a positive correlation between the change
in wages for native-born workers and measures of immigrant penetration
across states or regions in the United States.2 The effect is reversed when
regional fixed effects are included (see their table 2), which, they argue,
soak up immigrants’ tendency to move to permanent high-wage areas.
(As an aside, the existence of permanent high-wage areas is obviously
inconsistent with the convergence hypothesis that Borjas investigates.)
In a forthcoming paper, I provide a different interpretation of Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz’s ﬁnding.3 In the presence of some form of increasing
returns to scale, as in models with trading externalities or agglomeration
effects,4 steady or anticipated increases in labor supply may induce an
offsetting increase in labor demand, leaving wages unchanged. For exam-
ple, the decision of migrating software engineers to settle in Silicon Val-
ley does not put downward pressure on wages in that region. Rather, it
further cements the region’s dominance in this industry, ensuring that, in
the future, firms will continue to locate most job openings in the area.
Although this phenomenon is most obviously relevant to more skilled
workers, it may also help explain the geographic concentration of the
American textile industry, for example. As evidence of this effect, I show
in my forthcoming paper that a state that experiences an unusually high
birth rate has a large entering cohort in the labor market twenty years
later—an anticipated labor supply shock. When the shock hits, the unem-
ployment rate falls, and wages and labor market participation increase, evi-
dence that labor demand has increased more than proportionately. If this is
correct, persistent immigration of workers with particular skills will not
reduce wage dispersion. This may explain why wage dispersion can sur-
vive in the presence of large-scale domestic and international migration
of both labor and capital.
What does all this mean for the efﬁciency gains from immigration? On
the one hand, it means that immigration is unlikely to contribute much to
regional wage convergence in the United States, and so the efﬁciency gains
discussed in this paper are probably not empirically relevant. On the other
hand, with increasing returns to scale, immigration may help supply
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
2. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996).
3. Shimer (2001).
4. Diamond (1982) investigates models with trading externalities, and Ciccone and
Hall (1996) consider models with agglomeration effects.
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Silicon Valleys beyond a critical threshold. This is a different form of efﬁ-
ciency gain from immigration, and unfortunately one that cannot easily
be quantiﬁed in Borjas’s framework. It suggests, for example, that the U.S.
economy is so strong and dynamic because its labor market is constantly
reinforced by immigration, rather than the commonly assumed converse,
that the U.S. labor market can easily incorporate immigrants because its
economy is so strong and dynamic.
Robert H. Topel: The central idea of George Borjas’s paper is that immi-
grant labor, as a highly mobile factor, enhances market efﬁciency by arbi-
traging productivity differences across locations. Further, he argues, some
of the returns to this activity accrue to natives, over and above the tradi-
tional measure of the immigration surplus that is due to increased labor
supply and changing factor proportions, so that traditional measures may
understate the benefits of immigration. The paper certainly affected my
thinking on this topic, although I read the evidence rather differently than
does the author. In the end I came away with the view that the forces stud-
ied here are, empirically, fairly small. But the theory and evidence pre-
sented are nevertheless important.
The paper proceeds along three fronts. First, Borjas makes a theoreti-
cal case for an additional, “efficiency” gain from immigration. Second,
he provides evidence that immigrants make location decisions in a manner
consistent with arbitrage of geographic wage differences. Last, he provides
a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the size of these additional efﬁciency
gains.
What exactly is the efﬁciency gain to natives? On this the paper is less
than clear. Borjas’s definition includes two apparent components. The first
is a gain from immigrant clustering: when wages differ across geographic
areas, immigrants have greater incentive to cluster in particular areas
(those that offer them high wages). Clustering maximizes the surplus that
accrues to natives because it has the largest impact on factor proportions.
The second component is a reduction in mobility costs incurred by natives.
If immigrants arbitrage geographic wage differences, then natives do not
have to.
To evaluate these points, consider ﬁgure 1 below. The curves V1 and V2
represent identical marginal productivity schedules for two geographic
markets. If, initially, the labor supplies in the two regions are L1 and L2,
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W1>W 2, there is something to be gained from arbitrage that increases
labor supply in market 1. The questions raised by Borjas’s definition are,
Who does the arbitraging, natives or immigrants? And who gets the gain in
output? 
If we follow Borjas’s assumption that exactly enough immigrants enter
market 1 to equalize wages, then the welfare gain to natives is equal to
4α. This would be the immigration surplus as traditionally understood, if
that surplus is measured correctly, accounting for its concentration in one
market. To arrive at his notion of the gain from optimal immigrant behav-
ior, Borjas needs to deﬁne an alternative world, and he chooses one where
immigrants allocate themselves randomly across the two markets. This
complicates matters slightly, because when immigrants do the “wrong”
thing, other agents (that is, natives) compensate by changing their migra-
tion behavior, and this must be taken into account.
If immigrants move equally to markets 1 and 2, they generate a sur-
plus of α in each market, or 2α in total. This is not the end of the story,
however, because wages are still unequal, and this will cause natives to
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Figure 1. Gains from Immigration in a Two-Region Economy with Homogeneous
Labor and Fixed Capital
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let the total cost of this migration be C. The net gain from this activity is
2α – C. So the net gain from immigrants behaving optimally rather than
in a particular nonoptimal way is 4α – (2α + 2α – C) = C. Optimal immi-
gration saves natives the mobility costs of arbitraging wage differences
themselves; there is no other component of gain.
As Borjas notes, the alternative world he assumes is essentially arbi-
trary, and I have to confess that its attraction escapes me, especially given
the propensity of immigrants to concentrate in a small number of immi-
grant enclaves. Yet there is something attractive in the idea that a calcula-
tion of the “gains” from immigration should account for what would have
happened otherwise. For example, let the alternative world used in calcu-
lating the gains from income-maximizing immigration be no immigration.
In this case migration by natives from market 2 to market 1 would raise
national output by 2α – C, so the net gain from allowing immigration is
4α – (2α – C) = 2α + C. Component 2α is the traditional surplus that
would accrue to natives if markets were initially efﬁcient (W1= W2), so the
difference is once again C, the mobility cost of native arbitrage.
It appears to me that this is the main sense in which immigrants can be
said to “grease the wheels”: because natives do not have to provide their
own grease, they save C. It is true that traditional measures of the surplus
from immigration do not account for this effect. Yet this does not mean that
the usual measure understates the gains from immigration. In the previ-
ous example, a traditional measure of surplus would ignore the costs and
the benefits of native migration in the absence of immigration. That is,
the traditional measure would calculate the gains as 4α, the gain in out-
put in the market that absorbs the immigrants, ignoring the fact that natives
would have produced 2α – C anyway. The net gain from immigration is
2α + C < 4α. In other words, there is no assurance that a traditional mea-
sure of the immigration surplus, small as it might be, is too small.
Borjas’s empirical work provides evidence that the location decisions of
immigrants are affected by financial rewards: there is a slight tendency
for immigrants to settle in markets that offer them high wages for their
skills. I found the empirical setup attractive and the evidence quite useful,
yet I came away convinced that the estimated effects are not large enough
to make the theoretical story a compelling one. For example, the estimated
supply elasticity for new immigrants (Borjas’s table 3) is about 1.4. Given
usual estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to new supply,
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will not have much impact on wages. This is not surprising in light of the
fact that immigrants remain highly clustered.
The evidence on wage convergence is also interesting, although here I
think the issues in this paper are quite different from those taken up in the
usual convergence literature. The wage differences that Borjas studies are
(as I read them) generated by temporary demand or supply shocks, and
they apply to identical workers. The working hypothesis is that mobile
immigrants arbitrage these differences. In contrast, much of the conver-
gence literature focuses on wage differences that are generated by human
capital differences across countries or markets, and it is plausible that their
elimination takes a long time.
General discussion: An important part of the discussion focused on the
distributional impact of immigration and, as a consequence, on its political
economy. Benjamin Friedman stressed that in Borjas’s framework all of
the gains to natives from immigration accrue to the owners of capital,
whereas workers’wages are strictly reduced. Moreover, some of the gains
to capital go to foreign owners. Although in principle one could imagine
a transfer mechanism by which the winners compensate the losers, in prac-
tice such mechanisms do not exist. Immigration is not Pareto improving
and is therefore likely to have significant consequences for the political
economy. Shang-Jin Wei suggested that the conflict between owners and
the workers is itself costly, and that the lobbying costs of attempts by both
groups to influence immigration policy should also be taken into account
in a broader welfare analysis.
Several participants discussed costs and benefits of immigration not
accounted for in Borjas’s model. Robert Topel noted that the model has
only one final good, so that distribution is only affected by what happens
to factor payments. In a world with many goods, the distributional conse-
quences are not so straightforward. For example, if a lot of doctors were let
into the country, driving doctors’wages down, the gains would accrue not
to capital but to native consumers—workers as well as capitalists—as the
costs of health care are reduced. Robert Gordon reminded the panel that
immigrants tend to be younger than the native population. As a conse-
quence, increased immigration can help address the problem of Social
Security solvency, by raising the ratio of workers to retired people. Edward
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place and have very long lives is an important reason, missing from the
model, for the slow decline in the population of regions suffering nega-
tive shocks. A decline in housing prices in these regions partly compen-
sates for lower wages, slowing outward migration. Inexpensive housing
also attracts immigrants to these areas. Gordon commented that immi-
grants are undoubtedly a major factor in the revival of central cities in
many parts of the country. Michael Kremer noted that other forms of cap-
ital are more mobile than buildings and argued that introducing mobility of
such capital into the model could qualitatively change the results. For
example, immigration may economize on the costs of moving capital
rather than of moving domestic labor. William Nordhaus urged against tak-
ing too narrow a view of the beneﬁts of immigration. Immigrants increase
the variety of commodities that are available (an obvious example being
ethnic foods) and enrich the culture in a host of other ways, such as
through music and literature, not captured in economic models.
Robert Hall argued that the welfare analysis of immigration requires a
more global perspective in which immigration costs and the opportunity
costs of emigration—the economic value of the immigrants’ services in
their home country—are taken into account. He also observed that con-
fronting traditional human capital–based growth theory with the gap
between immigrants’wages in their home and host countries highlights the
importance of other kinds of capital, including institutional and infra-
structure capital.
Several panelists discussed ways in which the imperfect measurement
of wages could distort the results. Nordhaus noted that, in principle, loca-
tion decisions should depend on real wages, and he deplored the poor qual-
ity of the available data. Both he and Gordon suggested that if part of
observed wage differences reflects unmeasured differences in the cost of
living or compensates for differences in amenities and disamenities, the
speed of convergence may be underestimated and the gains from immi-
gration overstated. 
Hall pointed to the potential for identification problems to bias the
results: unmeasured features of states like California and New York may be
the cause of both high wages and high immigrant penetration. Kremer sug-
gested, on the other hand, that the coarse division of types of labor may
result in underestimates: if there are many small labor submarkets, the
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immigration, could be greater than those calculated from the more aggre-
gated data.
William Branson found it informative to relate the paper to the debate
about the euro area. Europessimistic economists in the United States have
argued that Europe’s lower labor mobility made eliminating exchange
rates a bad idea, because it left the European countries with no way to
deal with relative real disturbances. The counterargument was that labor
mobility in Europe comes not from Europeans moving from country to
country within Europe, but by marginal adjustments to labor supply by
immigrants from outside the region. The Borjas paper, Branson noted,
illustrates that immigration serves the same important function in the
United States. 
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